Two years after the boys arrived in America, their parents flew out to join them and the family settled in Oregon, where Huang studied electrical engineering before heading south to Silicon Valley. He founded Nvidia in 1993 with two fellow engineers. The chips that would make Nvidia famous, graphics processing units (GPUs), were then a product used mainly for video games, and the market was crowded. Nvidia became dominant by designing better chips and, crucially, getting them to market first. By the mid-2010s, Huang had become convinced that AI would transform computing and that GPUs, whose ability to perform many calculations simultaneously made them well suited to AI models, would become its essential building blocks. For years that was an unorthodox position to take. AI was always touted as the next big thing, but its moment never quite seemed to arrive. In November 2022, OpenAI, a modelmaker, released ChatGPT. Demand for Nvidia’s chips, on which ChatGPT was trained, exploded. Nvidia’s market value climbed from $340bn to $5trn in just three years. The company’s success rests on more than clever chip design: it’s also dependent on the ability to manage relationships with supply-chain partners, and the political environment which affects them all. Heroes of software companies are often portrayed as lone geniuses, but hardware-making is an inherently collaborative project. Nvidia’s latest product, Vera Rubin NVL72, is a complete AI supercomputer for training and running large AI models. It contains 1.3m components, more than 1,000 chips and the software needed to harness them. Building one requires hundreds of suppliers, manufacturers and software companies to work together. The AI boom has led to a scramble for those components, and a big part of Huang’s job is ensuring that suppliers prioritise Nvidia’s orders. Money helps. Nvidia has used its enormous balance-sheet to sign multi-year deals with manufacturers. Huang also needs his suppliers to make more. Analysts believe Huang has pushed back several times against TSMC’s caution about investing in new capacity.
So far, Huang has kept the intricate supply chain humming. But other challenges are mounting, not least the threat of competition from Nvidia’s biggest customers. Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Microsoft are each seeking to reduce their dependence on Nvidia by developing their own AI chips. Nvidia’s stock price meanwhile has become a proxy for investor sentiment about how long the AI boom can last, and has dipped several times this year. Huang’s answer is to bind Nvidia even more tightly to the future of AI. Rather than selling only chips, he also wants to provide the infrastructure, software and AI models on which the industry runs. This strategy will require even more supply-chain diplomacy, and I wasn’t surprised to see Huang schmoozing manufacturing partners in the exhibition hall during his time at the conference. His staff explained that he made a point of visiting suppliers’ booths because his presence draws crowds and gives them publicity. Shouts of “Jensen! Jensen!” echoed through the hall as he made his way from stand to stand to chat to engineers and executives, high-fiving people along the way. Only late in the afternoon did he seem to tire, sitting cross-legged on the floor of a booth to share a beer with a Taiwanese executive. Hundreds of fans crowded round to capture the moment on their phones.
After his keynote speech I sat down with Huang in a private room in the conference hall. By then he had shed his leather jacket for a navy cotton one. Outside, his staff and security were bustling about, but Huang seemed calm and relaxed. When I explained that I wanted to understand him rather than Nvidia, he looked faintly embarrassed. He was uncomfortable talking about himself, he said, and apologised in advance if he did a poor job of answering my questions. On stage he’s an exuberant performer, but in private conversation he almost whispers, speaking in slow, measured sentences. I asked how his life had changed since the launch of ChatGPT. Silicon Valley lore is full of founders who become celebrities overnight. Huang’s rise has been about three decades in the making, which may have made the transition to superstardom even stranger when it finally came. Nothing, he insisted, had really changed. He dressed the same way and, as he put it, still “puts his pants on one leg at a time”. Huang hasn’t just had to get used to being famous; he has also found himself at the centre of a geopolitical contest between America and China. Since October 2022 the American government has been trying to stop its adversary from obtaining advanced computer chips. Nvidia’s suppliers in Taiwan, meanwhile, live under the growing threat of military action by China. Huang suddenly found he needed to build rapport with world leaders, not least Donald Trump, whom he has lobbied to relax restrictions on chip exports. Hanging out with politicians doesn’t come naturally to him, he said. He has nonetheless proved adept at translating his goals into language that appeals to them. He recasts data centres as “AI factories”—a term that appeals to Trump’s enthusiasm for manufacturing. To foreign governments wary of relying on American companies, he has offered “sovereign AI”—national infrastructure built around local values, and largely powered by Nvidia. In May he demonstrated his knack for diplomacy when he joined Trump on a trip to China for a summit with President Xi Jinping. Huang appears to have been a last-minute addition to the entourage—many were surprised when Trump announced on Truth Social that “the Great Jensen Huang” was on board Air Force One. In Beijing Huang met Chinese officials and
accepted a seat on the advisory board of Tsinghua University, one of China’s most prestigious institutions. China hawks are suspicious. Steve Bannon, a former White House chief strategist, called Huang an “agent of influence” for the Chinese Communist Party and demanded his arrest. Elizabeth Warren, a Democratic senator from Massachusetts, has said that Huang’s lobbying for the sale of advanced AI chips to China could “turbocharge China’s military and undercut American technological leadership”. Yet, oddly, for a supposed China-appeaser, Huang has acted as a public booster for Taiwan. He says Taiwan made Nvidia possible and calls it his “business home”. Nvidia is building one of its largest offices outside America in Taipei and plans to invest around $150bn every year. The balancing act doesn’t always go smoothly—in 2024 Huang angered China by describing Taiwan as “one of the most important countries in the world” (he was forced to clarify that he had been praising the island’s electronics industry rather than recognising Taiwan as a state). Being an AI hardware titan in today’s world, he told me wryly at Computex, is “the biggest communications job ever”.
Huang doesn’t rely on charm alone to get suppliers to do what he wants. According to Rick Tsai, a former boss of TSMC, who has worked with Huang for decades, he is also “hard driving” and “relentless”. Tsai calls Huang’s approach to the supplier relationship “rough justice”: an understanding that sometimes one side is right, sometimes they are wrong, but over the long term, the wins and losses roughly balance out. This same brand of rough justice appears to govern life inside Nvidia. Employees say Huang has little patience for excuses and is known to challenge people when something is not working. Around 60 people report directly to him, an unusually high number for a chief executive. He gives feedback immediately and publicly, reasoning that the entire room can learn from the bruising. I occasionally saw traces of the unfiltered style. At a press conference, Huang rebuked a staffer who moved too quickly to snatch a microphone from an analyst. When a BBC reporter asked about the geopolitical risks facing Taiwan, Huang initially offered a well-rehearsed answer. When the reporter continued to press him he joked that someone should help the BBC come up with a new question. The audience laughed, but Huang’s annoyance was evident. Rev Lebaredian, an engineer who has worked at Nvidia for more than two decades and is now a vice-president there, said that Huang’s executive team meetings would look “miserable” to an outsider. All the talk is about problems and things that are failing; good news is rarely discussed. Yet according to Lebaredian, Huang has created a culture where employees know that although their mistakes will be called out, they will not be punished for making them. Nvidia’s senior leadership team has remained stable over the past two decades, a rarity in the industry. They have also been well rewarded. Huang likes to boast that he has created more billionaire executives than “any CEO in the world”. Rank-and-file employees have not done badly, either. When I asked Huang what drove him, he didn’t speak about colonising other planets, defeating death or remaking humanity. Elon Musk was a friend, he noted wryly, but they had different goals. His, he said, were simpler: he
wanted his employees and partners to do well. “Maybe,” he said with a smile, “I’m just not sufficiently ambitious.” ■ Shailesh Chitnis is a global business writer at The Economist. Photographs by Leong Chong Lao This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/interactive/1843/2026/09/03/how-jensen-huang-became-ais- taylor-swift
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Will anybody use AI as much as coders do? The answer will have big implications for the investment boom Sep 3rd 2026 How software engineers at Silicon Valley startups spend their days has changed dramatically over the past few years. The output is still the same: reams of code. But instead of sitting and typing, they whisper into microphones. Their instructions are then transcribed using artificial intelligence and fed to AI agents—bots that can interact with software and, in this case, write it. Other white-collar workers are not yet “in this world”, admits Colin Jarvis of OpenAI, maker of ChatGPT. The future of his employer—and the AI boom at large—hinges on that changing. To justify their colossal outlays on data centres, America’s cloud giants, and AI labs such as Anthropic and OpenAI, need adoption of the technology to continue spreading rapidly. A back-of-