first visit in a decade. The drills and the visit were probably planned well before America’s war with Iran started in February. The aerial drills were happening for the second year running. And the official purpose of Mr Xi’s visit is to mark the 70th anniversary of diplomatic ties between China and Egypt. Nonetheless, they send a clear signal about Chinese ambitions in the region. China is demonstrating its potential as an alternative supplier as well as its growing capacity to project air power far from home. And it is doing so just as America’s dominant military role in the Middle East is undermined by its failure to defeat Iran, the depletion of its weapons stockpiles and the damage done to its bases, which it has been unable to protect adequately. China has neither the capability nor, it seems, the desire to supplant America in the Middle East. But it is getting steadily better at carrying out limited operations to help partners and protect its interests in a region that is vital for China’s trade and energy supplies. At the same time, China is gaining experience and data that could help its pilots in future combat against Rafales and other Western equivalents. India will be especially concerned. During its conflict with Pakistan in 2025, at least one Indian Rafale appears to have been shot down by Pakistan’s Chinese-made fighters. (Indian officials, while acknowledging that they lost some fighters, deny that a Rafale was among them.) Egypt is not the only target of Chinese military diplomacy in the region. China has used arms sales and joint exercises to improve defence ties with other countries too, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), even though both have close military links to America. China and the UAE were due to start their latest round of joint air drills in north- western China in late August. These have happened yearly since 2023. Neither side has said which aircraft will take part but in the past they have involved the UAE’s French-made Mirage fighters, which Taiwan also uses. Such drills are partly marketing exercises. In 2024 Egypt was reported to have placed its first order for Chinese fighter jets, an undisclosed number of single-engine J-10s. China denied that. But it sent J-10s to the first round of joint air drills with Egypt in 2025 in an apparent bid to clinch a sale. Egypt may have been considering them as replacements for its ageing American F-
16s, which it started buying in 1980. Now China appears to be touting the heavier, twin-engined J-16 as a way to help Egypt carry out longer-range operations over the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and elsewhere. The exercises also give China a chance to test its ability to quickly project air power far from its own borders. The J-16s took about nine hours to fly the 6,000km from China to Egypt. They were refuelled by a Chinese YY-20 air tanker that flew with them. The Chinese fighters and other aircraft also stopped over in the Pakistani city of Karachi. Pakistan is one of China’s closest military partners, so the layover highlights its potential as a staging point for Chinese operations farther afield. But it was the mock combat with Egypt’s Rafales that grabbed most attention back in China. Its state television broadcast footage from the cockpit of one of the J-16s showing a Rafale manoeuvring nearby. It said the drills included one-on-one and two-on-two combat. Such “dissimilar air combat training” offers pilots more valuable experience than drills with the same kind of fighters. They also let each side gather data on the other’s aircraft. How long it will be before China can engage in real combat so far from its borders is unclear. But as a future capability, it has clearly locked on to that target. ■ Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/09/01/the-lengthening-reach-of-chinas-armed- forces
The serious, rivalrous business of Chinese barbecue Some cities say they’ve been eating kebabs since the Han dynasty Sep 3rd 2026 STEP ASIDE, Texas. The Chinese city of Qiqihar is laying claim to the global barbecue crown. Located in the country’s far north-east, it recently concluded a barbecue festival, inviting the world to enjoy its flavour. Banners across the city of 4m assert it is the “international barbecue capital”. That is a big claim for a place few outside China have heard of and equally few could pronounce (roughly, chee-chee-har).
Qiqihar’s real beef is not with Texas brisket or Aussie snags but with other Chinese cities. Barbecue has become a big business in recent years. The grilling industry nationwide was worth around 270bn yuan ($40bn) in 2025. Several cities are vying for the thickest cut of that total. Qiqiharians make a good case. Their region has some of China’s largest grazing pastures. In the summer locals sit on the streets and toss tasty beef on coal-fired grills along with onions and sauerkraut. They are adamant that their meat is the best in China and that they have the figures to prove it. Between 2020 and 2025 the city’s beef sales grew from around 5bn yuan to 30bn. The biggest challenge to Qiqihar has come from Zibo, a city in eastern China specialising in meat skewers. In 2023 its barbecue stalls became a hit travel destination. Tourism income grew by 70% compared with the year before. Local officials were quick to support the trend. Banks were encouraged to hand out “barbecue loans” to help budding entrepreneurs source mutton and set up stalls. Accommodation became so scarce the government imposed price controls. The craze in Zibo ignited a bigger barbecue battle. Jinzhou, another north- eastern town, has claimed for years to be China’s pork-skewer capital. When its officials saw Zibo’s success, they sent a delegation to figure out how best to bank their own shanks. Residents in Xuzhou, another eastern city,
believed their meat-grilling tradition to be much older than Zibo’s and more deserving of tourist spending. Stone carvings from 2,000 years ago purportedly show people eating meat on sticks. Local netizens claimed Zibo had pilfered their heritage. China’s summer travel spots often go viral on social media but quickly fade. Zibo has struggled to maintain excitement over its delicacies. Its heavy investments in grilling have reportedly led to many failed vendors. Meanwhile Qiqihar now supplies a network of restaurants across the country, which sell the region’s beef and thus support its economy. Qiqihar may not pose a threat to Texan pitmasters but it has a healthy claim on China’s cookout capital. ■ Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/china/2026/09/03/the-serious-rivalrous-business-of- chinese-barbecue
In film and in life, China pursues dragon- restaurant diplomacy It is full of contradictions but welcomed by many as an alternative to Western power Sep 3rd 2026 “WELCOME TO Dragon Restaurant”, a new Chinese box-office hit set in a thinly disguised Iraq, will not win any Oscars. The plot is outlandish, many characters cartoonish. Yet people outside China should still watch it. For one thing, it depicts the American invasion of 2003 from an unfamiliar vantage: not the green-tinged light show beamed into Western homes, but the shriek and crash of bombs slamming into a slumbering city, shocking and awful. In following a Chinese chef who profits from the war until it turns on him, the film also carries political significance. It sheds light on China’s self- image and its positioning in the Middle East and beyond. If it seems absurd
to read so much into a movie, remember that commentators have used another one, “Wolf Warrior”, as shorthand for China’s aggressive diplomatic stance over the past decade. Dragon-restaurant diplomacy reflects a different style—and a better approximation of Chinese foreign policy in the round. Its organising principle is to be friends to all people, motivated more by mercantilism than political ideology. The approach, both in the film and on the ground, is often superficial and contradictory. Yet it would be a mistake to ignore its appeal to countries tired of overweening Westerners. The hero of the film (which in English is officially called “Once Upon a Time in the Middle East”) is Xu Fu. He moves to a fictionalised Baghdad in the hope of making more money from his cooking. When war starts, he discovers the lucrative “Green Zone” that houses the American forces. Western soldiers and, ahem, journalists like his food and love his booze. He rakes it in, until a suicide-bomber strikes. His former business partner is implicated, so Xu spends time in an American jail. Later, Islamic militants capture him. Chinese state media and intellectuals have heralded the film as a parable of what China offers a world wrecked by America. Yet there is more to the film, not all of it flattering to China. A central conceit is that China wants to be liked by everyone. Xu Fu is a paragon for any good, nimble Chinese diplomat. His local partner is an official in the pre-war regime; Xu stays loyal to him even after he loses power. American soldiers also grow fond of him and, especially, his cooking. So does the terrorist mastermind who seizes him. Through it all, Xu sees their common humanity. The film, to its credit, is not blind to the tensions. “Your partner was the perpetrator. Your friend was the victim. You really think you’ve got nothing to do with this war?” an American soldier asks him. That might prompt self-reflection in Chinese officials who protest neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war and are peeved when Westerners point out that China’s supplies and cash keep the Russian forces going. You really think you’ve got nothing to do with this war? Xu’s motivation also rings true. He is both candid and shameless at the outset in his desire to make a quick buck to pay off debts. As his Chinese partner reflects, profiting from war is a stroke of luck. It is a small example of the opportunistic commercialism that drives much Chinese activity overseas. It sounds grubby. But for countries on the receiving end, it is often