Mr Trump believes he has, with some justification. The Institute for Supply Management’s survey of manufacturing purchasing managers has indicated expanding factory activity every month this year (see chart). The Federal Reserve’s industrial-production index shows that real manufacturing output grew at a 4.5% annualised rate in the first half of 2026—its fastest pace since 2011, excluding the rebound after covid-19. This month Ford said it would shift production of some models from China to America beginning in 2030, a decision its boss linked to tariffs. If any industry embodies American manufacturing, it is carmaking. Mr Trump has made it a focus of his tariff policy, imposing a 25% levy on imported cars and many imported parts. Trade talks between America and Canada recently broke down in part over the industry. Mr Trump then threatened to raise tariffs on all cars, trucks and parts from Canada to 50% from January 1st. The president can point to some results. From December 2025 to July 2026 vehicle production jumped by about 9%, accounting for around a quarter of the overall rise in manufacturing. Ford is not the only carmaker changing its plans. General Motors (GM) will also shift some production from China to America, avoiding tariffs of more than 50% on Chinese-built vehicles. GM has cut back Canadian operations, too. Stellantis (whose largest shareholder
part-owns The Economist’s parent company) has moved future production from Canada to America. Honda is moving production of its Civic from Mexico to Indiana. These plans, however, do little to explain the rebound in output that has already occurred. That owes more to a recovery from supply disruptions late last year, strong demand for pickups and SUVs, and the launch of new models. For now, tariffs are doing more to raise costs than boost output. GM estimates that tariffs will set it back by $2.5bn–$3.5bn this year, largely because it still imports vehicles and parts. In other industries the upswing was under way before Mr Trump’s return to office. Aircraft production grew by nearly 9% in the first half of the year, but the industry’s recovery began in 2022. Electrical-equipment makers are still benefiting from an investment cycle accelerated by policies enacted under Joe Biden. Subsidies for renewables helped spur spending on transformer factories and other grid equipment, says Donald Leavens of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association. “A lot of that is still playing out today.” Some of the strongest manufacturing sectors are also among those least protected by tariffs. Take the AI boom, which has lifted demand for equipment and materials through the construction of data centres and energy infrastructure. From December 2025 to July 2026 output of semiconductors and electronic components rose by more than 12%, data-centre cooling equipment by almost 4% and cement by nearly 9%. The Economist estimates that in the first half of 2026 the data-centre and power buildout accounted for nearly a third of the increase in manufacturing output. While some AI hardware, such as chips, is increasingly a target of tariff policy, many AI-related imports have been carved out of broader tariffs. The pattern extends beyond AI. Scott Lincicome of the Cato Institute, a libertarian think-tank, calculates that aerospace, computers and electronics face effective tariff rates of less than 5%, among the lowest in manufacturing. Meanwhile, manufacturing mainstays facing higher tariffs— from food to textiles—have barely grown this year.
For voters the real test of Mr Trump’s policies is jobs. On that score, the renaissance is harder to find. In the first seven months of the year manufacturing payrolls edged up by about 31,000—a tiny gain compared with the 315,000 factory jobs lost between 2023 and 2025. Aerospace and industries tied to AI-related construction accounted for all of the net job growth. Across more traditional manufacturing, meanwhile, employment fell. Even in some of the industries driving the production rebound, job gains have been modest. Employment in the car industry is up by less than 1%. Chipmakers have shed workers even as output has surged. Where manufacturing jobs are appearing, they look different from the traditional factory work Mr Trump evokes. Aircraft plants, for example, need engineers and technicians. Nearly six in ten workers have a bachelor’s degree or higher; only one in five works on the factory floor. The infrastructure boom is similarly brainy. The revival, in other words, is conspicuously short of factory hands. Even if more carmaking returns later this decade, the armies of assembly workers will not. Robots now do much of the work. Meanwhile, the industries expanding fastest are struggling to find enough skilled workers. Mr Trump’s presidency may see investment in automated factories and create demand for high-end talent. That would constitute a manufacturing revival, but perhaps not the kind his supporters hoped for. ■ Stay on top of American politics with The US in brief, our daily newsletter with fast analysis of the most important political news, and Checks and Balance, a weekly note that examines the state of American democracy and the issues that matter to voters. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/united-states/2026/08/25/does-donald-trump-deserve- credit-for-a-manufacturing-revival
Shrimpers are the latest group seeking protection from Washington But Donald Trump is waking up to the risks of pricey food Aug 27th 2026 “WE SHOULD BE excited, but we’re not because we got a boatload of shrimp and it’s worth no money,” says Waylon Buras, watching his men unload a 40,000-pound haul onto the docks of the Louisiana bayou. The fisherman had just returned home after 13 days at sea, the longest trip of his career. Lifting a fistful of iridescent shrimp to the sun, he notes with frustration how perfect they are: “They look like glass.” In May a pound sold for $2.00, but today he will get just $1.80. Cheap shrimp from abroad keep driving down prices, while high fuel costs wipe away any remaining profit. He wants the government to do more. “They can either subsidise us at the end of the year or they need to put a
hold on the imports so we can catch our breath,” he says. “We’re almost drowning.” Gulf-coast shrimpers from Alabama to Texas are the latest group hoping to benefit from Donald Trump’s tariffs. Last year taxes on imported food more than quadrupled. Mr Trump has not stopped imports of shrimp, but in July his trade representative announced duties of at least 10% on a broad swathe of goods, including shrimp from countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia. The problem for shrimpers, as for some other American industries, is that tariffs may not be enough to save them, and may in the meantime raise costs for everyone else. American shrimpers didn’t always struggle to compete. When seafood casseroles and Jell-O salads became popular in the mid-20th century, housewives bought home-grown shrimp. Then aid programmes scrambled the economics. In the 1970s, the World Bank and USAID spent billions teaching malnourished communities in Latin America and South-East Asia how to fish at scale. Today nearly 95% of the shrimp Americans eat is imported; in four decades the share harvested in the Gulf fell from 29% to 4.5%. A National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) report published in March found
that a pandemic-era glut turned a simmering problem into a crisis. Between 2021 and 2023 prices of Gulf shrimp halved, making shrimping unprofitable. Crews stopped going out to sea and the industry lost 1,200 jobs. Revenue more than halved in just two years, to $221m. Hurricanes and oil spills add more risk. “Every shock shrinks the fleet,” says Christopher Liese, an economist at NOAA who wrote the recent report. The shrimp lobby was relieved to be included in the administration’s tariff announcement in July. Jessica Domangue, a representative in the Louisiana House, reckons big-shots in Washington are finally “waking up” to the plight of her constituents. However it is unclear how long the tariffs will last. Twenty-five states have sued to block Mr Trump’s new levies, which the White House has sought to impose under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. If they are held to be legal, Mr Trump may himself move to lower them. The president seems to be realising that tariffs do indeed raise prices and that American consumers don’t like that; voters now rank affordability as their top concern. Florida lobbyists persuaded the White House to place a heavy duty on Mexican tomatoes, which supply 70% of the domestic market. In the nine months to April, tomato prices surged by 50%. Such effects were predictable. In the 1930s sugar magnates secured the dream protection package: tariffs, production caps and price supports from the government. Americans now pay a fifth more than the global average for sugar. The American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank, estimates that the policies cost each household $40 a year and keep just 4,000 farms afloat.
For some food products, Mr Trump is now reversing course. After raising fees on coffee, cocoa, beef, bananas and avocados last summer, the administration lowered them a few months later (see chart). Facing a broad backlash over grocery prices, on August 21st the president said he would let 300,000 tonnes of ground beef be imported, tariff-free, for 90 days. Hamburger-lovers cheered; cattle ranchers are furious. Pete Ricketts, a Republican senator from Nebraska being challenged by a left-leaning Independent, Dan Osborn, was among the president’s usual allies to break rank. “Flooding the market with lower-quality beef”, Mr Ricketts wrote on X, “compromises Nebraska farmers and ranchers.” Even if tariffs do remain, they are unlikely to solve the economics of shrimping. “Tariffs may buy time but won’t make the industry competitive or make the underlying issues go away,” says David Ortega, a food economist at Michigan State University. The average vessel in the fleet that fishes federal waters in the Gulf is 34 years old. Chronic problems have made reinvesting in infrastructure a bad bet. Some legislators are now pushing for more changes. Bills in Congress would bar federal funds from supporting overseas aquaculture and require the government to buy only American shrimp for school lunches, military cafeterias and food programmes.