Yet some municipalities work. South of Mpofana is Umngeni, which in 2021 ditched the ANC and elected a mayor from the Democratic Alliance (DA), the second-largest party. Chris Pappas has been credited with an overhaul. In July the FW de Klerk Foundation, an NGO, rated Umngeni as the seventh- best-run municipality in a sample of 50, ahead of Cape Town. Today Umngeni has funded budgets and receives clean audits. Poor- performing bureaucrats have left or been fired. Mr Pappas has cracked down on inflated procurement schemes. The savings have helped to erect 3,000 new streetlights, fill potholes and expand a scheme for the very poor that subsidises small amounts of water and electricity. The once-dirty town centre is clean. New firms have moved in. More than 2,000 net new jobs have been created in an area of 100,000 people. In Zanzene Village, a poor part of Umngeni, residents seem to appreciate the changes. “Everything is good: the roads, the water, we even pay for electricity,” says Nomfundo Buthelezi, explaining that she does not mind so long as the money is well spent. Musa Mchunu, a gardener, notes there is a new football pitch and a youth centre. “Most importantly,” he adds, “the municipality now responds—we no longer get the blue ticks,” a reference to WhatsApp messages that are read but ignored. The DA hopes that a record of good governance will increase its vote share, including among black voters, who historically have opted for the ANC or its offshoots. Among its targets is Johannesburg, where one recent poll has the DA on 42%, up from 26% at the 2021 local election. The ANC, which has run the city into the ground, is on 18%, barely half the 34% it won in 2021. Such highs will not be reached everywhere in South Africa. In the recent poll the ANC still remains ahead of the DA (34% versus 27%) on average. Race remains highly predictive of whether a voter opts for the DA, even though it runs just 12% of all municipalities but accounts for most of the clean audits. Yet 32 years after the end of white rule, when most South Africans are despondent about democracy, showing that political choices can make a difference is crucial. Mr Mchunu, a former ANC member, says that he did

not vote for Mr Pappas last time, but may do so in November. “I tell my sons that apartheid is over. What matters is not race but changing the country.” ■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/08/20/state-capture-is- holding-back-south-africa

Middle East & Africa | Irro’s gambit Somaliland wants to help secure the Red Sea The president hopes this will bring international recognition for the would-be state Aug 20th 2026 Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi is an ambitious man. In December 2024 the 70-year-old former diplomat (pictured), who is better known as Irro, was sworn in as president of Somaliland, a breakaway republic that declared independence from Somalia in 1991. Last year he was the would-be country’s leader when Somaliland was formally recognised by Israel, the first nation to do so. “The world has been ignoring Somaliland for 35 years,” Irro tells The Economist. He wants outsiders to take a closer look.

Irro’s pitch centres on the Red Sea. The trade route has been a mess of late, with shipping menaced by the Houthis, an Iran-backed militia that rules much of Yemen. Speaking this month during a visit to Nairobi, Kenya’s capital, Irro says Somaliland can help secure the strategic waterway by offering military bases to global powers along its coastline. Once trade can flow unmolested again, he wants Somaliland’s main port at Berbera to be the primary gateway to the markets of the Horn of Africa. “Our message is that we are a responsible partner” in security and trade, says Irro. He suggests that Somaliland could, in effect, be the new Djibouti. That tiny port-state rakes in some $125m a year by renting out slices of its coastline to foreign armies. America, China and France (among others) have bases there. It also earns many multiples of that amount in annual port fees paid by landlocked Ethiopia, which depends on Djibouti for most of its international trade. Irro wants a slice of both Djiboutian cakes. He is trying to persuade Ethiopia to use Berbera, where the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has built a new harbour, as its main outlet to the sea. He also wants to entice America to set up a military base there. That would give America more options if it chooses to resume its war against the Houthis, whom it bombed intensively last year. Access to military facilities around Berbera is widely believed to have been

part of the deal Israel struck with Irro when it recognised Somaliland in December. Some reports suggest that America and Israel may already be developing a military presence at Berbera, with covert support from the UAE, which operates an existing base there. Irro denies such reports. “There is no Israeli or American presence yet,” he says. But the UAE has another base at the port of Bosaso in Puntland, a neighbouring semi-autonomous province of Somalia, where unconfirmed reports suggest Israel is also embedded. As competition for military properties on the Red Sea heats up, Irro says he would be willing to offer both Israel and America bases at Berbera “if they are interested”. Next month Irro will visit Washington, where he hopes to have a tête-à-tête with Donald Trump. Were that to happen, he would become the first president of Somaliland to meet directly with an American counterpart. “We expect the recognition of the United States some time in the future,” says Irro, adding that Somaliland anticipates recognition from at least one more country “before the end of the year”. Irro’s ambitions are ruffling regional feathers. Djibouti is irked by Somaliland’s desire to barge in. Irro hints that his northern neighbour is trying to “destabilise” his country, presumably by supporting hostile militias on the border. Relations with Somalia are even more strained. Mr Irro claims Somalia, which considers Somaliland a renegade province, has plans to mobilise troops along the southern frontier. “This is not a peace recipe,” he adds. It does not help that Israel and Turkey, a patron of Somalia, are increasingly hostile to each other. Turkey has long been trying to mediate between Somalia and Somaliland, yet numerous rounds of talks in Ankara and Istanbul have failed. “Next time they can happen in Tel Aviv,” chortles Irro, who seems unbothered by the prospect of a proxy war. Yet America may well be reluctant to stir the pot by recognising Somaliland. The Houthis, meanwhile, have threatened to attack any Israeli military installation in the statelet. An American base there could become a target, too. That would shatter the reputation for peace and stability on which Somaliland has long built its case for international recognition. But “there is

nothing free in the world,” says Irro. He seems willing to pay a price to put his country on the map—the question is, how high? ■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/08/20/somaliland-wants-to- help-secure-the-red-sea

Middle East & Africa | After the count Zambia’s tainted election threatens its reputation President Hakainde Hichilema’s image as a liberal reformer is tarnished, too Aug 20th 2026 WHEN HAKAINDE HICHILEMA was elected as Zambia’s president in 2021, he promised to reverse the democratic slide in the southern African country of 23m. During his long years in opposition, including a spell behind bars, he had preached liberal principles. In office, he initially cracked down on bullying party cadres. In a survey last year, more than three- quarters of Zambians thought he had done a good job of strengthening democracy. But that reputation may not survive the events of Zambia’s recent election, which was held on August 13th. Mr Hichilema, who was declared the winner on August 18th, almost certainly received the most votes. But

evidence of inflated vote tallies presented by independent observers suggests he did not win 60%, as the electoral commission claims. The killing of a former cabinet minister by state security forces during a raid on the house of Brian Mundubile, the main opposition candidate, further tarnished the process. So did Mr Mundubile, who claimed victory without showing evidence. Voting itself went relatively smoothly. The crucial moment came the day after polling, when the electoral commission suspended the vote count, citing unspecified attacks on its staff. When tallying resumed, several hours later, the situation had “deteriorated significantly”, according to observers dispatched by the European Union. Instead of recording results as soon as they were announced, the returning officers seemed to wait for instructions from the commission’s headquarters. The armed forces maintained a heavy presence at the centres where votes were added up. In some places, oddly, many more votes were apparently cast in the presidential race when compared with the number of votes cast for parliamentary candidates—even though the two ballots were held at the same time. Early analysis by Nicole Beardsworth, of the University of Witwatersrand, and Nic Cheeseman, of the University of Birmingham, suggests that the discrepancy may amount to 350,000 to 550,000 votes. The Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG), an independent local election observatory that was conducting its own parallel count, thinks that votes were added to Mr Hichilema’s tally in 30 of the 226 constituencies, boosting his overall score by four percentage points, something which has not been observed in any previous Zambian election since verification began in 2001. None of this supports Mr Mundubile’s claim to be the real winner. Even without the inflated tallies, the CCMG still thinks Mr Hichilema got 56% of the vote. Mr Hichilema’s team says that turnout was higher in the presidential race because more voters cared about it. “The choice facing the country was national, and turnout followed it,” says a spokesperson. Yet the vote is not the only concern. On August 14th the police and armed forces raided Mr Mundubile’s home. Afterwards he said they had shot Mutotwe Kafwaya, an opposition politician and former cabinet minister.