barred from competition. After all, such tech could one day enable rivals abroad to engineer horses that outrun even Argentina’s famed bloodlines. At the same time as Argentina’s economy bucks and rears (shrinking by 2.5% in February, growing by 2.8% in March then contracting by 1.5% in April), the polo world seems unbothered. That is thanks, in part, to a steady flow of foreign direct investment. Rich foreigners, known as patrons, bring money aplenty into Argentina’s polo bubble. They buy land, hire players and haggle over horses, creating a trickle-down economy for grooms, farriers, trainers, vets and architects. Sustained growth has been the result. Two decades ago Juan Martín Batistuta, an equine vet, worked almost entirely on racehorses; today he works almost entirely on ponies. “I’ve never been busier,” he says. Nor is the boom confined to Buenos Aires. “From Córdoba to Patagonia, all over Argentina you have so many more clubs,” says Mr Fernández. The country now has 177. The sport’s profile is rising globally, too. A Netflix documentary released in 2024 and a broadcasting deal with ESPN have brought it to new audiences. The approval ratings of Javier Milei, Argentina’s president and a polo fan, are suffering as he attempts to reset the country’s economy. He might glance at proceedings in Pilar: a world-beating industry making the most of its competitive advantage, attracting foreign investment and adopting new technologies to bolster its position as the world’s leading exporter. An ideal remedy, perhaps, for a long face. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2026/08/19/polos-lessons-for-argentina
The South American hipster language cooler than Spanish Why Guaraní has become trendy in Paraguay Aug 20th 2026 One hour into their Guaraní class, the medical students at the National University of Asunción are enthralled. One group provides “pytyvõpya’ehasývape” (first aid) for a “kangue opẽ” (broken bone). Another frets that a problem with the “tajygue mboaty rehe” (nervous system) may require “ñembovo” (surgery). The course is mandatory for Paraguay’s future doctors, part of a wave of official measures to promote the indigenous language. Few seem to mind. “I love speaking Guaraní—it’s much friendlier than Spanish,” says Tadeo Ramírez, an undergraduate. Such zest reflects the recent revival of Paraguay’s ancient tongue. Just 2.3% of the population identifies as indigenous, but some 90% understand
Guaraní. Nearly 40% speak it every day at home along with Spanish, according to a recent survey. That is one of the highest rates of bilingualism in the world, far ahead of official diglots like Canada and Ireland. Most of this is “Yopará”, a blend of Spanish and Guaraní (the word means “mixture” in Guaraní). “It’s our lingua franca,” says Miguel Ángel, a taxi driver. Paraguay is one of only two countries in the Spanish-speaking Americas with an official second language. Paraguay’s elites had long snubbed Guaraní as a rural vernacular, mocking its nasal sounds and glottal stops. Dictator Alfredo Stroessner discouraged its use in schools in the 1950s and 1960s. Only with the return of democracy in 1992 was Guaraní recognised as Paraguay’s official language alongside Spanish. A law in 2010 created a bilingual curriculum and administration. Today Paraguayans can choose to vote, marry and stand trial in Guaraní. This has facilitated a cultural craze. In June Paraguayan football fans attributed their World Cup win over Germany to “Guaraní spirit”. In May the national symphony orchestra performed Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy” in Guaraní for the first time. In April Spain’s Queen Letizia opened her message of congratulations for the anniversary of the Spanish cultural centre in Asunción with “¡Vy’apavẽ ne arambotýre!” (”Happy Birthday!”). Youngsters are joining in. Influencers fill TikTok and Instagram with vocab tutorials; artists pump Yopará rap and jazz onto Spotify. Trendy parents give their children names like Yerutí (dove) and Marangatu (virtuous). Some worry that growing bilingualism comes from Guaraní speakers learning Spanish rather than vice versa. The share of monolingual Guaraní speakers dropped from 28% in 2002 to 12% in 2022. “It’s a process of displacement,” says Arnaldo Casco of the Secretariat of Linguistic Policy (SPL), a ministry. It has responded by publishing reams of Guaraní content, from technical dictionaries to poetry. Guaraní must cover all spheres of social interaction, says Javier Viveros, the SPL’s boss. Others are laid back. Spanish monolingualism is flat. Guaraní is on Google Translate and Wikipedia (“Vikipetã”). SPL staff are training large language models on it. Social norms have shifted. “We who have gone through that experience of being hesitant to speak Guaraní as children today feel
absolutely free,” says María del Carmen Giménez of the Patria Soñada Institute, a think-tank. That speaks volumes. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2026/08/20/the-south-american-hipster- language-cooler-than-spanish
Violent Israeli settlers want to provoke a Palestinian uprising A military junta is consolidating power in Iran State capture is holding back South Africa Somaliland wants to help secure the Red Sea Zambia’s tainted election threatens its reputation
Middle East & Africa | The West Bank Violent Israeli settlers want to provoke a Palestinian uprising They are operating with the support of Israel’s government Aug 20th 2026 THE HILLS south of Nablus in the Israeli-occupied West Bank tell the story of a creeping annexation (see map). Winding dirt tracks to Palestinian villages are blocked by rocks and piles of earth, cutting off access from fields and olive groves. Israeli settlers have planted vines in neat rows, erected fences festooned with flags and brought in herds of goats. They patrol the area with new utility vehicles and assault rifles given to them by the Israeli government. Their stated aim is to cause “friction” with adjacent Palestinian villages. That tends to lead to intervention by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), often on the settlers’ side, followed by the expulsion of Palestinians and the
expansion of outposts of Israeli settlements (see chart 1). Since the Hamas attack of October 7th 2023, and Israel’s subsequent war in Gaza, violent attacks by Israeli settlers in the West Bank have worsened and forced an increasing number of Palestinians to flee (see chart 2). As Israel prepares to go to the polls on October 27th, the failure of Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, to rein in the settlers is making counter-violence by Palestinian militants increasingly likely. Events over the past week show how much leeway settlers are granted. Tel Talpiot, the latest and northernmost outpost in the Shiloh settlement bloc, was set up earlier this year on a hill overlooking three Palestinian villages. On August 9th a group from Tel Talpiot occupied the courtyards of homes on the outskirts of the village of Qusra, setting up a makeshift shelter, terrorising the families and forcing them to hole up inside. IDF soldiers sent to “prevent friction” joined the settlers in prayer, rather than dislodging them. The tactic, common in the West Bank, often succeeds in forcing Palestinian villagers to flee their homes (see chart 2), allowing the settlers to take over the surrounding land. This time was different for several reasons. Residents of Qusra, who had experienced similar attacks before, were quick to publicise this one and attract international attention. One of the besieged
homes belongs to an American citizen. Mike Huckabee, the American ambassador, who usually supports the settlers, posted on social media that it was his embassy’s “request to remove the Israeli terrorists”. Three days into the siege, the IDF belatedly replaced the unit in Qusra with a more disciplined infantry battalion. It tried to remove the settlers and evict the Tel Talpiot outpost. The settlers brought in reinforcements and remained in the area. “It was an embarrassing incident,” said one officer. “The settlers forced us to play cat-and-mouse, and we lost.” The IDF announced the homes were in a “closed military zone”. It forced the families to remain blockaded indoors and prevented activists from coming to their aid and media from visiting. “We are besieged, the army is not allowing us to leave our house,” said Qusai abu Ridi, one of the residents. But he was adamant they would continue to protect their property. That makes Qusra, despite everything, a rare case of Palestinian residents managing to hold on to their homes. Yet the incident is also part of a fresh escalation over the past month, as settlers have tried to grab as much land as they can before the election, which might return a government less supportive of their cause. On July 24th a group of armed settlers arrived in the village of Tel on what they claimed was a “hike.” Four Palestinians and
two Israelis ended up killed. In response, the IDF deployed more troops and locked down Palestinian towns, including Nablus, one of the largest in the West Bank. The IDF claims to be enforcing order, but it has overseen a steep rise in attacks on Palestinians. The Shin Bet, Israel’s security agency, says 660 “nationalistic” attacks took place in the West Bank in the first half of 2026, up from 405 in the same period last year. More than 1,100 Palestinians have been killed in clashes with the IDF and settlers since October 7th 2023. The events in Qusra highlight the IDF’s disinclination to prevent settlers’ attempts to chase out Palestinians. Senior officers, both serving and retired, blame a breakdown in discipline and the presence of settlers within the IDF’s ranks. But ultimately they hold the government responsible. While the IDF’s high command has publicly condemned the attacks in Qusra, Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, has remained silent. On August 14th Israel Katz, the defence minister, said that enforcing the law on settlers in the West Bank would, from now on, be the responsibility of the Israeli police and not the IDF. Since the police lack personnel in the West Bank and are under the control of the far-right national-security minister,
Itamar Ben-Gvir, himself a settler, they are unlikely to enforce the law in the area. Israel deploys vast forces and intelligence resources in the West Bank to protect half a million settlers. In theory, the IDF is obliged to protect Palestinians, too. But soldiers will only do this if their political masters expressly tell them to. That is unlikely to happen under Mr Netanyahu, who needs the support of settler-friendly far-right parties to have a chance of retaining power after the election. Things in the West Bank could get worse before then. Security officials warn that settlers are trying to provoke another intifada, a Palestinian uprising, which will force the IDF to enter Palestinian cities. That would bring even more violence and misery to the West Bank’s embattled Palestinians. Even if Mr Netanyahu’s party were voted out, his successors may have to deal with a crisis of his making.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/08/17/violent-israeli- settlers-want-to-provoke-a-palestinian-uprising