output—risked being trapped in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) soon redirected about 5m b/d via pipelines. Strategic-stock releases by rich countries, including America and Japan, covered another chunk. But the biggest shock absorber has been a near-halving of China’s crude-oil imports, to 5.5m b/d. Curtailing China’s imports has been a feat of state engineering, achieved by releasing stocks, restricting exports and managing demand. It is worrying when China’s autocratic rulers have such a firm grip on any market. They often use their leverage in the global economy—from being the biggest importer of barley to refining more rare-earth elements than anyone else—to bully critics and impose costs on countries that irk them. The Iran war, though, has shown that oil consumers can benefit when big buyers exercise their market power. For decades the king of the oil markets has been the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Together with its allies, which include Russia, the cartel controlled around half of global crude production before the war. opec usually aims to keep prices artificially high by agreeing restrictive quotas on production, often co-ordinating output cuts (though occasionally it has done the reverse, allowing Saudi Arabia to flood the market to try to kill off rivals, notably American shale). The cartel’s manipulation of the market is like a tax on the global economy. Estimates of the economic damage it causes range from fairly modest to a hefty $5.7trn between 1970 and 2014 (or 0.15% of global GDP each year). China’s oil strategy, by contrast, has proved helpful this year. Its accumulation of vast stocks when prices were low will have imposed a small cost on the global economy at the time. But dampening price spikes is correspondingly beneficial. If China ends up smoothing peaks and troughs in prices, it could make investments in new sources of supply easier to plan. Trying to buy low and sell high can go wrong, as any speculator knows. Thankfully it is China that bears that risk, and the costs of storage. The balance of power in oil markets may shift again. For a while, once the Gulf crisis abates, there could be a “superglut” of crude, which was originally forecast for 2026. OPEC will also be weaker than it was before
the war. The UAE, once its third-largest producer, quit the cartel in May, and other members are itching to pump more. Yet over time the supply of oil may contract faster than demand, and China’s role in influencing the latter could shrink. Every two years, as oilfields deplete, the world loses one Saudi Arabia’s worth of crude supply. At a global level, investment is inadequate to replace those barrels beyond 2030. This could tilt the balance of power back to the cartel, because the Gulf’s state-owned giants are among the few still investing in ambitious new projects. Its share of supply will rise. At the same time China’s demand could fall, owing to the advancing electrification of its economy. It might judge that it needs fewer reserves. If so it will buy less during gluts and cut imports by fewer barrels during a crisis, meaning it no longer absorbs as much of an oil-price shock. China has shielded oil markets from the effects of the Iran war out of pure self-interest. Its export controls have left diesel, petrol and kerosene in much shorter supply than they would usually be at today’s crude-oil price. It also keeps information about its stocks scarce, so America and others do not know how long it could withstand sanctions or war. That makes the oil market harder to anticipate. But the consequences of its interventions have bought other oil importers time. They should use it to diversify their sources of supply and reduce their oil consumption. The simplest way for them to avoid dependency on any autocratic regime is to have less need for the black stuff in the first place. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/08/13/china-has-wrested-control-of-oil- markets-from-opec
In praise of designer-ish babies Couples should be allowed to select embryos on the basis of both disease resistance and IQ Aug 13th 2026 Having transformed human life, Silicon Valley is now coming for birth. A spate of startups offer screening services that allow couples having children via in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) to assess embryos based on their genetic risk of diseases such as breast cancer and diabetes. Some venture further into science-fiction territory, providing scores for IQ and height, or even eye and hair colour. Critics are dismayed. Some worry firms are pushing immature technology onto vulnerable couples. Others say that even if the tech works, its use is immoral. Both arguments contain kernels of truth; neither is ultimately
convincing. Banning or heavily restricting embryo screening would be a mistake. For now, the debate is a niche concern. The startups mostly cater to the rich, famous and odd. Yet that will change. A wave of investment means that the cost of IVF is likely to fall. If offered embryo screening at the same time, many couples will take it. One survey suggests that three-quarters of Americans support screening embryos for diseases; about a third say the same for non-disease traits. And that is before competitive pressure kicks in. Who wants to see their child bested by genetically selected classmates? Many medics—including nearly every genetics and reproductive-medicine group in the rich world—question whether such “polygenic” prediction is ready for consumers. In Britain, where fertility is more regulated than in America, selecting an embryo on the basis of non-approved factors is unlawful. There are indeed reasons for caution. Polygenic scores are tricky. For many diseases caused by a single gene, testing offers near-certainty: if an embryo has the material, it will develop the condition. Yet an assessment of multiple genes leads to risk estimates, rather than a binary answer—and such estimates are more accurate for people with European ancestry, because they are better represented in genetic databases. Further caveats are in order. Risk reductions can look large in relative terms but be small in absolute ones, particularly for rare diseases. Selecting for some traits may raise the risk of other less desirable ones. Even for highly genetically determined traits like height, parents remain limited by the range found in their own embryos. These facts are an argument for disclosure, however, rather than legal restrictions or outright bans. If companies want to offer polygenic scoring, they must adequately communicate the technology’s limits and risks. They should also let their tests undergo independent scrutiny. This will not scupper a nascent business, since the startups are not, as some critics allege, selling snake oil. A study in 2019 found that parents choosing from among ten embryos may be able to boost their child’s height by 1-6cm and IQ by between one and seven points—with tech that is now nearly a decade old.
As genetic databases get better and cover broader populations, and AI draws out the relationship between genes and traits, scores will improve. Such progress will raise difficult ethical questions. Some, including the “Make America Healthy Again” movement, argue that fertility tech corrupts what should be a natural process. Others worry that if polygenic screening is limited to the rich, their offspring will have another unfair advantage. The scariest critique is that fertility entrepreneurs are this century’s eugenicists. But none of these arguments stands up to scrutiny. “Unnatural” technology is already used in many modern births: this argument against embryo selection just as easily applies to IVF, for instance, which only zealots want banned. Costs should come down, making screening more widely available. And there is a big difference between the murderous coercion of early-20th- century eugenics programmes and parents seeking as much knowledge as possible when picking an embryo. Couples desperate for a clever child might be better advised to focus on what happens after birth. Yet so long as parents understand there is no such thing as the perfect baby, the state should not stand in the way of a bit more information. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/leaders/2026/08/13/in-praise-of-designer-ish-babies
Does air-conditioning contribute to urban heat? Also this week hospital malpractice, red-light therapy, the night-time economy, Andy Burnham’s taste in music, burgers Aug 13th 2026 Letters are welcome via email to letters@economist.comFind out more about how we process your letter People pushing for more air-conditioning in places like Europe do not recognise that it is a big contributor to urban heat (“The geopolitics of air- conditioning”, July 25th). Research has shown that operating AC during a heatwave in Paris, where most residents still don’t have AC, increased ambient city temperature by 20C (3.60F). Adopting AC as the dominant cooling strategy in cities will condemn them to more miserable summers, hurting outdoor workers, athletes, tourists and anyone not inside air- conditioned space.