brother to the disenchanted young. The incumbent, Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND), probably has enough support to win a second term (results are expected on August 17th). But he has also tilted the playing field in his favour, using tactics he once decried. Mr Hichilema spent years in opposition, facing spurious charges of treason, before his triumph in 2021. One of Zambia’s richest businessmen, he presented himself as the man to fix an economic crisis. His government has restructured unpayable debts, cut subsidies, boosted reserves and kept the IMF happy. It has also reduced the tax bill of the copper industry, which accounts for two-thirds of exports. The reforms have “poised us for growth”, purrs Sokwani Chilembo, chief executive of the Zambia Chamber of Mines. That growth is slower than the government promised. An ambitious production target of 3m tonnes a year by 2031 will surely be missed (last year’s output was about 890,000 tonnes). Not for want of buyers. China is revamping a railway to the Indian Ocean. Western countries are backing a transport corridor to the Atlantic. Zambia does not want to pick sides, and has rebuffed American attempts to link mineral access to health assistance. “Common sense is that you don’t put all your eggs in one basket,” says Situmbeko Musokotwane, the finance minister.
With copper in such demand, could more of the gains be kept in the country? Many Zambians think so. Some allege that Mr Hichilema is soft on foreign- owned mining companies because he is secretly funded by them (which his aides and the mining companies deny). He has abolished fees in state schools and allocated more money to local government, both highly popular moves, but still struggles to shake off his elitist image. In other ways, he has had a makeover: the man who stood up for Zambian democracy from a jail cell is now weakening it from State House. Repression is not quite as thuggish as it was under the Patriotic Front (PF) government of the 2010s, when Zambia began its authoritarian slide. Gone are the cadres at markets and bus stations who used to shake down passers- by. Instead, citizens worry that a critical Facebook post could result in arrest under cyber-crime laws. “Institutions still act the way they acted under the PF,” says Josiah Kalala of Chapter One, a pressure group. The PF itself did not field a candidate after struggling with internal divisions and state interference. Mr Mundubile, a former PF politician, galvanised old followers behind a new brand. On the campaign trail, he was obstructed by UPND supporters throwing stones; he says that some of his sympathisers were arrested. He draws much of his support from the north and east. Mr Hichilema draws his from the south and west. The main battleground is in the towns, where ethnic ties are weaker. Zambian democracy has life in it yet, and a surprise is not impossible. Whoever wins will need to find answers to long-standing economic questions. Nearly two-thirds of Zambians live on less than $2.15 a day; only five countries have a higher poverty rate, and they are all either in conflict or have much less money to go round. After two years of good harvests, the return of El Niño now brings the threat of drought. The last time it happened, in 2024, low inflows at hydroelectric dams cut power to just a few hours a day. The task for the next president is to take the copper boom beyond the mine gates. ■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/08/12/zambias-election-is-a- test-of-metal
Middle East & Africa | The stuck-in-the-middle men War in the Gulf has weakened two of America’s Arab allies Egypt promised to fight and Jordan promised to stay neutral. Neither delivered Aug 13th 2026 NEARLY TWO years ago King Abdullah of Jordan told Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian foreign minister, that his own country would not be a “battleground for regional conflicts”. A decade earlier, while campaigning to be Egypt’s president, Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi made the opposite vow to Gulf states: should their security be threatened, Egypt would be “one step away”. Yet today Jordan is at the centre of a regional conflict between America, its closest ally, and Mr Araghchi’s government. As for Egypt, it may be one step away—but it has stayed there. Though the Gulf faces its greatest threat in 35 years, Mr Sisi has offered little beyond words.
The broken promises are revealing. Jordan is paying a price for a war over which it has little control. Egypt has been sidelined as a mediator and military power. They have long sold themselves as pillars of the regional order. But the order looks wobbly—and both countries look lost. Surrounded by stronger neighbours and bereft of natural resources, Jordan views close ties with America as the key to its survival. In return, America has made it one of its largest recipients of foreign aid. Thousands of American troops are deployed at air bases such as Muwaffaq Salti (pictured), which host fighter jets, aerial-refuelling tankers and other warplanes vital to the war with Iran. Hosting them made Jordan a target for Iran. It is also unpopular. Hundreds of politicians, retired army officers and other prominent Jordanians recently signed an open letter calling for American troops to leave. Yet the king cannot afford to comply. Last year Jordan received more than $1.6bn of American aid (3% of GDP). This month America pledged another $355m. Jordan needs that money as the war batters its economy. Missile attacks forced flight cancellations and scared off visitors; tourism revenue, already whacked by the war in Gaza, has fallen again. Jordan relies on natural gas from Israel for half of its electricity. Israel suspended exports when the war began, fearing Iranian strikes on its rigs. That forced Jordan to switch to diesel, heavy fuel oil and spot cargoes of liquefied natural gas. Though exports resumed in April, the IMF expects Jordan’s energy-import bill to be 36% higher than in 2025. Iran has tried to deepen a schism between the king and the public. Even as its missiles and drones hit the kingdom, it claims it has “no hostility” towards the Jordanian people and that America, not Iran, has “violated your territorial integrity”. Such appeals may find little purchase: many Jordanians view Iran as a threat. Still, the war is a dilemma for a government struggling with domestic discontent. Egypt’s economy is holding up better. It is expected to grow by 4.6% this year. The IMF has just unlocked the latest $1.8bn tranche of a four-year loan agreement. Tourism, which accounts for 13% of jobs, remains strong. More
than 9m people visited Egypt in the first half of this year, a 3% increase on the same period in 2025. At first glance Egypt’s other big sources of hard currency, revenue from the Suez Canal and remittances, look solid as well. The former rose to $2.4bn in the first half of 2026, up from $1.8bn in the same period in 2025. The latter reached a record high in the year to June. Both could be lagging indicators, however. Iran-backed attacks on shipping in the Red Sea could dent canal revenue. As for remittances, a lot comes from Egyptians in the Gulf. A prolonged slump there would mean fewer workers to send money. Meanwhile, the government has raised some electricity tariffs by 12%. For now, though, Egypt’s biggest weakness is status, not solvency. After the Hamas-led massacre in Israel on October 7th 2023, Mr Sisi was in high demand. His spy chiefs have a long relationship with the Hamas leadership in Gaza, owing to their shared border. Antony Blinken, America’s previous secretary of state, visited Egypt seven times in the year after the massacre, more than any other country bar Israel. The final negotiations for a ceasefire took place in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh in October 2025. Egypt has been far less relevant in the war with Iran. It has been eclipsed as a mediator by Pakistan, Turkey and Gulf states. Nor has the Arab world’s largest army done much to defend its neighbours—even though the Gulf has given Egypt tens of billions of dollars in aid since Mr Sisi seized power in a coup in 2013. Officials in Cairo argue that Gulf states are receiving help from other allies, and that Egypt has other threats on its borders. Still, its inaction has irked its friends. In March Anwar Gargash, the diplomatic adviser to the president of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), complained about “major” Arab countries sitting idle. “Where are you today in a time of hardship?” he asked. Egypt did deploy a squadron of Rafale fighter jets to the UAE—although it only announced this in May, a month after an initial ceasefire between America and Iran took effect. It was noticeably absent on August 7th, when Saudi Arabia signed a mutual-defence pact with Pakistan and Turkey, although Saudi officials suggest it could join later. Yet staying out of the war
has not bought it protection. Last month a drone struck a natural-gas facility in Damietta, on Egypt’s Mediterranean coast. The tripartite pact is a glimpse of the Middle East’s future. Fearing they can no longer rely on America, regional countries will need to take more responsibility for their own defence. That will be an uncomfortable place for Egypt and Jordan.■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/08/10/war-in-the-gulf-has- weakened-two-of-americas-arab-allies
Middle East & Africa | Three’s a crowd What to make of a new Saudi-led defence pact Turkish arms producers may be the first beneficiaries Aug 13th 2026 ONE boasts NATO’s second-largest army and a booming defence sector. Another is the Muslim world’s only nuclear power. And the third is the world’s eighth-biggest arms spender. No wonder that Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia made a splash on August 7th when they signed a defence pact, especially after officials said it included a mutual-defence clause similar to NATO’s Article 5. “Any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all,” said Pakistan’s foreign ministry. The three powers stress that other regional powers are welcome to join the pact, batting away suggestions of a Sunni military bloc in the making. But the religious symbolism was laid on thick at the signing, attended by