Arctic energy development, that had been floated as candidates for co- operation between America and Russia in talks last year. These penalties cannot be lifted until Russia signs a peace deal accepted by Ukraine. More unusually, the bill imposes tariffs of up to 100% on all goods from the top five importers of Russian oil and the top five importers of Russian gas, as well as those helping Russia to evade sanctions. That would ensnare more than a dozen countries, including many of America’s friends. But there are two big caveats. Countries whose purchases represent less than 15% of Russia’s gas exports—and who are taking steps to reduce those purchases— are exempt. That should spare allies such as France and Belgium. The bill also includes a “national-interest” waiver that gives the president plenty of latitude. Depending on how they are implemented, the measures could have a significant impact on Russia. Oil and gas provide 20-25% of the government’s revenues. “Taken at face value, this would have a devastating effect on Russian oil exports,” says Elina Ribakova of the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “You have an economy in stagflation with zero growth this year, probably.” But it is not clear how tightly the Trump administration wants to squeeze Russia’s oil sector. America has already provided intelligence to Ukraine, helping it attack Russian energy infrastructure. The strikes have triggered a domestic fuel crisis. In July Russia’s fossil-fuel export revenues fell by 12% month on month. Earnings from crude-oil exports by pipeline fell by 21%, while oil-product export loadings dropped by 23%, to their lowest level on record. On August 12th Ukraine said it had attacked an oil refinery in Orsk, almost 1,000 miles behind the front line. Yet on the same day the Financial Times reported that J.D. Vance, America’s vice-president, had asked Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, to halt attacks on a pipeline terminal in the Black Sea, for fear of harming American firms and driving up oil prices. Mr Trump may also be wary of upsetting other foreign-policy priorities by implementing the tariffs to their fullest extent. China, India and Turkey are the largest importers of Russian crude. Slovakia, a NATO ally, could hit the
oil threshold and has few plans to change that. Japan depends on Russian gas. In practice, the bill gives Mr Trump a sliding scale of enforcement: tariffs can be set anywhere from just above zero to 100%, and adjusted as countries buy more or less Russian energy. Ten Democratic senators voted against the bill, fearing that it would hand Mr Trump a fresh weapon in his trade wars. One risk is that the Russia- related tariffs become bargaining chips in unrelated trade talks. Another is that punishment is meted out selectively—to friends, but not adversaries, as so often under Mr Trump. The legislation is yet another sign of the ballooning role of tariffs in American statecraft. Mr Trump had already imposed unprecedented “secondary” tariffs on countries aiding Iran. The new bill applies the same idea to Russia. The paradox, note Julian Arato, Kathleen Claussen and Timothy Meyer in a new paper, is that this expansion of tariff power reflects “a more constitutionally sound approach” than Mr Trump’s earlier levies. ■ Stay on top of American politics with The US in brief, our daily newsletter with fast analysis of the most important political news, and Checks and Balance, a weekly note that examines the state of American democracy and the issues that matter to voters. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/united-states/2026/08/13/donald-trump-is-getting-a-new- tariff-weapon-against-russia
Donald Trump takes a fresh swipe at childhood vaccines A new order only adds to confusion for parents Aug 13th 2026 BACK WHEN he was a reality-TV star, Donald Trump tweeted: “Healthy young child goes to doctor, gets pumped with massive shot of many vaccines…AUTISM.” More than 12 years later, on August 10th, Mr Trump acted on the thinking behind that dubious claim. A new executive order says the combined measles, mumps and rubella vaccine should be split into three. It advises giving those and other jabs at separate doctor visits. And it puts childhood vaccines into three buckets: those recommended for everyone (covering 11 diseases and infections, down from 18), those for high-risk groups and those to be decided on after talking to a doctor.
There is no evidence that vaccines cause autism. Nor is there evidence that spreading out vaccines is beneficial. In fact, doing so increases the window in which kids are vulnerable to infection. Doctors’ groups, therefore, lined up to denounce the order. The head of the American Academy of Paediatrics called it “not only disheartening but dangerous”. It puts “children’s health at risk”, said the boss of the American Medical Association. The good news, then, is that Mr Trump’s order will have little practical effect. States, not the federal government, normally set vaccination requirements for schoolchildren. And most of them are guided by abundant evidence that vaccines have driven down rates of infectious disease by a miraculous degree (see chart). But as the administration injects more doubt and confusion into decisions over vaccines, parents are increasingly declining them. Measles vaccination coverage among kindergarteners is 92.5%, down from 95.2% in 2019. That is worryingly low: an estimated 92-94% of a community must be immune to stop measles spreading. Many areas are already below that threshold, helping to explain why 2026 has already outpaced all of 2025 for measles cases.
The executive order is not the administration’s first swing at vaccines. In January the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) tried to pare back the schedule of jabs for kids. A judge halted the changes; the case is being appealed. In May another executive order instructed the CDC to copy countries that recommend fewer vaccines. Most consequentially, the administration has cut funding for next-generation mRNA vaccines. Nearly 80% of Americans think vaccines are safe, according to an Economist/YouGov poll, including most Republicans. Mr Trump’s favoured pollster has urged him to focus on other parts of Robert F. Kennedy junior’s agenda, like the health secretary’s promotion of nutritious food. Mr Trump’s decision to ignore that advice shows that vaccines are not just Mr Kennedy’s obsession, but the president’s too. ■ Stay on top of American politics with The US in brief, our daily newsletter with fast analysis of the most important political news, and Checks and Balance, a weekly note that examines the state of American democracy and the issues that matter to voters. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/united-states/2026/08/13/donald-trump-takes-a-fresh- swipe-at-childhood-vaccines
Democratic moderates get a surprising reprieve in Wisconsin The party has narrowly dodged a socialist insurgency in a crucial swing state Aug 13th 2026 Outside a polling centre in Milwaukee on the morning of August 11th, Sabley Sabin looks deflated. “I didn’t vote with my heart,” says the retired social worker, who has just cast her ballot in Wisconsin’s Democratic primary for governor. Calling mainstream Democrats “wusses”, she preferred Francesca Hong, an insurgent Democratic Socialist. But she voted for David Crowley. She reckons the moderate Milwaukee County executive has a better shot at building the coalition needed to win an election in a swing state like Wisconsin.
Other Wisconsinites seemed to share Ms Sabin’s calculation. For weeks polls had shown Ms Hong poised to win by double digits. In the end, Mr Crowley defeated her—though by a mere 3,783 votes. His victory suggests that appeals to moderation and electability still matter, especially in swing states. But Ms Hong’s near-win in spite of her considerable political baggage points to a Democratic coalition that remains angry, restless and increasingly receptive to populist-left candidates. There were reasons to think Wisconsin might be fertile ground for a candidate like Ms Hong. The state has a long progressive tradition. Robert La Follette, a Wisconsin governor who assailed corporate power, helped start the Progressive Party in the early 20th century. Milwaukee, the state’s biggest city, elected a string of “sewer socialists” as mayor between 1910 and 1960. The moniker reflected the priority they gave to municipal improvements, such as public sanitation, rather than to class struggle. Ms Hong, though, espoused views that were well outside the political mainstream. In an old tweet she called for Thanksgiving to be cancelled, saying it celebrated colonialism. In another she wrote that old white people at Culver’s, a fast-food chain, gave her “anxiety”. She had also expressed support for abolishing the police. When pressed on these comments, she struggled to explain them. The Democratic establishment was horrified. David Axelrod, a former adviser to Barack Obama, called the race a “slow- rolling car headed for a cliff”. Even some of the left’s biggest names kept their distance. Neither Bernie Sanders nor Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez endorsed Ms Hong.
Despite those liabilities, polling showed Ms Hong leading by 19 points in a crowded field of more moderate Democrats. Mr Crowley suspended his campaign on July 8th, saying he had no viable path to the nomination. An effort by establishment Democrats to consolidate behind Sara Rodriguez, the lieutenant governor, fell apart after she fired her campaign manager over financial mismanagement. Only in the final stretch did the party’s powerbrokers get their act together. After Ms Rodriguez dropped out Mr Crowley re-entered the race and won the endorsement of Tony Evers, the Democratic governor, who had previously vowed to stay out of the primary. He campaigned on his experience, including three and a half years in the State Assembly, and his record running Milwaukee County since 2020. The manoeuvring was so chaotic that several voters at a Milwaukee polling station said they had not realised Mr Crowley had ever suspended his campaign. Advertising probably helped him make up ground on Ms Hong, who did not buy a single ad on broadcast or cable television. The only spots in her favour came from Republican-linked groups seeking to boost the candidate they considered easiest to beat. By contrast, Mr Crowley and allied groups spent heavily on television. The Economist‘s analysis of the election results suggests that Ms Hong did much better than demographics would predict in