The biggest clash is over security. The United States is no longer just asking Ms Sheinbaum to crack down on drug gangs; it is pursuing her allies. In April the Trump administration indicted the then governor of Sinaloa, Rubén Rocha Moya, on charges including drug-trafficking. Mr Rocha Moya, who denies wrongdoing, is close to Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the founder of Morena, Ms Sheinbaum’s party. More than 50 Morena politicians have had their American visas revoked, according to Reuters, a news service. Mexicans are increasingly suspicious of American security agencies, worrying that they operate in Mexico outside the oversight of Ms Sheinbaum’s government. That impression was reinforced in July, when the FBI put on public display the aeroplane used to fly Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, a gang boss, out of Mexico and into the United States in 2024. Mexico’s government had been assured that American agencies did not take part in his capture. Ms Sheinbaum has launched an investigation. As an issue, migration had until recently been relatively calm. Since Mr Trump returned to the White House in 2025, Mexico has helped him reduce the number of migrants crossing into the United States illegally to a trickle. But on July 7th an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent shot dead a Mexican in Houston. Lorenzo Salgado Araujo had lived in the United States for 35 years and was not even the target of the operation. He was the 17th Mexican to die in ICE custody or operations since Mr Trump returned to office. Ms Sheinbaum might have kept quiet if Mr Trump had agreed to extend the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement beyond its current expiry in 2036. On July 1st he refused. The free-trade deal will now be reviewed annually, creating uncertainty. Ms Sheinbaum was “really banking” on the extension after kowtowing to Mr Trump, says Lila Abed of the Inter- American Dialogue, a think-tank in Washington. Ms Sheinbaum has become less obedient. She is refusing to extradite Mr Rocha Moya. Mexico’s courts are unlikely to find him guilty. Two days after the shooting in Houston she said that her government would ask for criminal charges to be brought in American courts for the shootings of Mexicans whose “only crime is working honestly in the United States”.
It is hard not to feel sympathy for Ms Sheinbaum. But in hardening her approach to Mr Trump, she may be missing an opportunity. She could use his attacks as cover to tackle what the Americans have correctly identified as one of Mexico’s most serious problems: political corruption. Instead, she has taken on a fierier, more leftist tone in recent speeches, while dismissing unfavourable media reports as “lies”. Clearly, it is hard to predict how Mr Trump will react. It will be a “delicate dance” in Mexico, too, says Ms Abed. Lots of Mexicans want Mr Rocha Moya extradited. They may accept Ms Sheinbaum losing her cool with Mr Trump; less so an embrace of allies accused of corruption. ■ This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2026/08/03/mexicos-president-stops-turning- the-other-cheek
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Middle East & Africa | Waste not, want not How long can Iran weaponise Hormuz? Longer than the world hopes, according to our Hormuz dependency dashboard Aug 6th 2026 For years the world has feared that Iran has been pursuing nuclear arms. Five months of war have taught the country’s rulers they were already in possession of another formidable weapon. Geography and firepower give them de facto command of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (lng) normally flows. Choking that artery gives Iran’s leaders immense leverage over their adversaries. Iran’s foes hope Hormuz will prove to be a wasting asset. Shutting Hormuz is “a card you can play once,” said Chris Wright, America’s energy secretary, in May. Gulf states are busily seeking alternative export routes.
Tom Barrack, Donald Trump’s envoy to Iraq and Syria, reckons the strait will be “an afterthought in two years”. The Economist has interviewed experts and analysed data to build a “Hormuz dependency dashboard” to test these claims. It points to three conclusions. First, the staying power of the Iranian threat varies by commodity and country. Second, Iran’s ability to cash in on the strait will diminish but may never vanish. Third, even if the fees Iran can charge fall over time, its strategic leverage will not necessarily fade in step. Indeed, it may deepen as the regime institutionalises its regional influence. Start with how much Hormuz traffic could simply circumvent it. Some 15m barrels of crude oil crossed the strait daily before the war. That looks easiest to divert. Saudi Arabia’s east-west pipeline, which avoids the strait by crossing the peninsula to Yanbu on the Red Sea, carried just 1m barrels a day (b/d) for export before the war. Today it is running at its full 7m b/d capacity. Nearly 5m b/d of that is exported; the rest feeds coastal refineries. The United Arab Emirates (uae) has maxed out its Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, which carries 1.8m b/d, up from 1m b/d before the war. Some 200,000 b/d flows through a smaller, once-idle Iraqi pipeline to Turkey.
That narrows the crude-export deficit to 10m b/d. Now add new pipelines likely to be built as a result of the war (see map). Acquiring land poses no problems in the Gulf’s command-and-control economies, says a lawyer familiar with the subject. The most advanced project, the uae’s, would run parallel to the existing line, adding 1.8m b/d by late 2027. Iraq aims to raise its pipeline’s capacity to 1m b/d within a year. It also plans a new one to link its southern fields with existing routes to Jordan, Syria and Turkey. Contracts for the 2.5m-b/d project are being awarded: it should be done within four years, says Rahul Choudhary of Rystad Energy, a consultancy. So by 2030 another 5m b/d of crude could bypass Hormuz. But that still leaves the same amount with no alternative route. And none of these fixes is foolproof. Iraqi projects could be derailed by security risks and cross-border rows. Many dreamed-up pipelines never see the light of day. Tankers leaving Yanbu for Asia usually sail via the Bab al-Mandab strait, where they are vulnerable to attacks by Iran-allied Houthi rebels. Saudi crude could travel via the Suez canal or Egypt’s Sumed pipeline. But even that route may not be safe: on July 29th a drone hit a tanker at Damietta, a port near Suez.
Iran—or its proxies—could attack new infrastructure that it fears depletes Hormuz’s power. Even if a deal is reached, the risk of attacks could still push up insurance and financing costs for such projects. Rerouting refined products is even harder. Gulf countries shipped nearly 5m b/d of petrol, diesel and other fuels via Hormuz last year. No overland pipeline alternatives exist for these. Saudi Arabia is planning one as part of a 2m-b/d expansion to its east-west corridor. But that is still at an early stage and would need a similar increase in Yanbu’s capacity. Iraq is sending 1,000 lorries of fuel oil to Syria a day, up from ten pre-war, but the route is slow and pricey. Syria has earned $15m-20m in transit receipts from the traffic since the war began. New refineries outside the Gulf would take longer to build than pipelines and cost billions of dollars. The problem is most acute for lng, exported almost exclusively by Qatar. No lng pipeline is under construction and no feasibility studies have been published. Qatar could lay simpler gas pipes to Oman, but they would need to carry as much gas as Russia’s four-string Nord Stream pipelines were once scheduled to deliver to Europe. More implausible still, Qatar’s entire liquefaction complex would need recreating on the Arabian Sea coast.
There is some room for hope. Most importers can, in time, wean themselves off Hormuz supplies. A few years of high prices could spur an extra 2m-3m b/d from the Americas and beyond. China’s refineries still hold ample spare capacity. lng is riding the fastest expansion in its history. So Iran’s leverage over global prices will weaken before the decade is out. The same is not true of its hold over its Gulf neighbours—and not just because a sizeable share of their energy exports will still need Hormuz for years. Many also depend on the strait for imports. The Gulf Arab states rely on external suppliers for 95% of their grain, but only Saudi Arabia has decent bulk-handling terminals, and these are not big enough to supply the whole region. Nor is moving lots of grain, iron ore or bauxite overland viable: a single Panamax vessel carries 60,000 tonnes of cereal, enough to fill 2,000 trucks. One obvious fix would be more regional railways, but these would also be slow and costly to build. Past mining-railway projects in Australia, built across similar terrain, have cost $12m-15m a kilometre. So a Red Sea-to- Qatar line could top $25bn. The Gulf states have strategic grain stockpiles that typically cover four to six months of demand, but no equivalent for containerised goods such as fresh