These days the populist left is ascendant. New York has a DSA mayor and soon Washington, DC, will get one too. DSA-backed insurgents have trounced incumbents in several congressional primaries. On August 4th Abdul El-Sayed beat Haley Stevens, a centrist backed by pro-Israel groups, in Michigan’s Democratic primary for Senate. Dr El-Sayed is not a DSA member—he calls himself a capitalist—but he draws support from the socialist crowd. In Wisconsin, Francesca Hong, an out-and-proud socialist, looks likely to win the Democratic primary for governor on August 11th. The momentum is fuelling speculation that a DSA-aligned candidate could nab the party’s presidential nomination in 2028. It is a remarkable development for a group with quirky governance, few members and many unpopular positions. The DSA has a structure unique in American politics: it is a discrete entity but its candidates compete on the Democratic Party ballot line, enabling it to change the party from within. Unlike the top-down model of the two big parties, where officeholders and donors hold sway, DSA members decide most things by vote. Their activism extends to union organising and agitating against data centres. This keeps the rank and file engaged outside campaign cycles. The DSA, says David Purucker, a sociologist and member, thrives during periods of Republican governance because “it’s on the barricades much more naturally than the Democratic Party”. The DSA likes to say that populist economics can carry the day. They point to Zohran Mamdani, New York’s mayor, who campaigned on rent control and free buses while downplaying other populist-left positions. But those other positions are still part of the DSA programme, which includes amnesty for all immigrants, non-citizen voting and reparations for black Americans. An unsuspecting visitor to their recent summit in Chicago would have wandered out with two questions. Had a Hyatt Regency ever hosted so many people sporting keffiyehs and septum rings? And had this group missed the backlash to the Great Awokening? In recent years many Democrats have concluded that populist-left positions such as “defund the police” are an electoral dead-end. In the House socialists occupy just a handful of seats in the 200-plus Democratic caucus. Most DSA primary victories have been in deeply Democratic terrain. In places where it is ascendant, like New York City, the
DSA is out-organising mainstream Democrats. The group combines social- media savvy with old-fashioned door-knocking. It has an ardent army of volunteers at the ready. The two major parties became so reliant on consultants and donor-funded advertising that their canvassing muscle atrophied, says Nate Knauf, a DSA leader in Atlanta. “You need actual human beings to move your politics, right? Our strength is our members.” Their number has swelled more than twentyfold in the past decade, but still totals only around 120,000. The prime target is the downwardly mobile millennial. Michael Lange, a political analyst and DSA member, says the question to identify prospective joiners is: “Are you under 50 and do you rent?” At its latest survey, in 2021, four-fifths of DSA members over the age of 25 had a college degree—twice the share of American adults. A third had a postgraduate degree and a third were gay or queer. Ashik Siddique, a co- chair of the DSA, says it is the largest queer membership organisation in the country. Members found to be working as cops can be expelled. Therein lies the paradox: a group that claims to represent the working class looks and speaks nothing like it. On all manner of social issues, from trans rights to policing to immigration to abortion, college graduates are far to the left of blue-collar workers. Take protections for trans people, a plank of the DSA platform. Only half of working-class people tell pollsters that it should be illegal to fire or evict a trans person, compared with 82% of left-leaning college grads. On economics, too, working-class and older voters tend to be more sceptical of the sweeping changes promised by the young new left, says Adam Carlson, a pollster. Mr Siddique, sounding a bit like Lenin, says the DSA’s task is to cultivate a working-class consciousness. The wrinkle is that working-class voters believe strongly in merit and hard work, notes Nicholas Jacobs, a political scientist at Colby College. They tend to be less enthusiastic about expanding government services while distrusting pointy- headed types who use words like “systemic”. Tellingly, in polling, only white left-leaning college grads count “tax the rich” as a top-ten priority. Michigan and Wisconsin are battleground states with close general elections, unlike most races where progressives compete. Dr El-Sayed and Ms Hong, presuming she wins her primary, will test the left’s electability thesis in
November. Victory in Wisconsin will disprove the idea that a socialist can never appeal to moderates, says the DSA. Some Democrats contend the party should welcome socialists within its big tent and that moderates ought to learn from their organisational prowess. Centrists fear the only lesson will be in defeat. “I actually do think it’s time for Democrats to talk the S word—schism,” James Carville, an ex-aide to Bill Clinton, said on his podcast recently. David Axelrod, a former adviser to Barack Obama, has called Democrats’ battle in Wisconsin a “slow-rolling car headed for a cliff”. ■ Stay on top of American politics with The US in brief, our daily newsletter with fast analysis of the most important political news, and Checks and Balance, a weekly note that examines the state of American democracy and the issues that matter to voters. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com/united-states/2026/08/05/americas-democratic-socialists- are-having-the-summer-of-their-lives
Amid foreign interference, Brazil’s election kicks off with a whimper Javier Milei’s Odysseus act Mexico’s president stops turning the other cheek
Amid foreign interference, Brazil’s election kicks off with a whimper Voters are disillusioned with the apparent choice between Lula and the son of a jailed former president Aug 6th 2026 Campaigning for Brazil’s general election in October does not formally start until August 16th, but already the race is testy. Donald Trump has slapped new, exorbitant tariffs on Brazil, his motivation seemingly more to do with politics than trade. Brazil’s government denied visas to two officials from the US State Department, claiming they planned to cast doubt on the integrity of the country’s electronic-voting system. On July 25th Argentina’s president, Javier Milei, travelled to São Paulo and gave a speech in which he referred to Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, as a “convict” and “thief”. And on August 4th the Trump administration revoked the visa of Brazil’s ambassador to the United States.
For all this fuss with foreigners, the mood among Brazilians is one of disillusion. Voters appear unenthusiastic about the choices on offer. Leading the race is the 80-year-old incumbent, known as Lula, making his seventh run for the presidency. His main challenger is Flávio Bolsonaro, the eldest son of Jair Bolsonaro, a populist former president serving a 27-year sentence for attempting a coup after losing the most recent election, in 2022. A slew of other right-wing candidates poll in single digits. Whoever wins will lead a divided country. Around half of Brazilians say they would never vote for Lula, and a similar share would never vote for Flávio. As well as their next president, Brazilians will pick governors for all 27 states, two-thirds of the Senate and every member of the lower house. The next president will have a chance to nominate four of the 11 justices who sit on Brazil’s Supreme Court, a powerful institution that often intervenes in politics. If no presidential candidate wins more than half the votes on October 4th, a run-off will be held on October 25th. Since Mr Trump returned to the White House in January 2025 right-wing lookalikes have won all seven presidential elections in Latin America. Mr Trump has interfered in several of them, publicly backing his preferred right-wing candidates. This has transformed Lula’s campaign. At his Workers’ Party convention on August 2nd, party leader Edinho Silva made it clear what the line would be: “We must choose between a Brazil of authoritarianism...that sells itself out...and a sovereign Brazil that defends our interests.” It is easy to imagine Mr Trump trying to sway Brazil’s ballot. Last year when Mr Bolsonaro—who fancied himself “the Trump of the Tropics”— was put on trial, Mr Trump’s government placed sanctions on the Supreme Court justice in charge of the proceedings and cancelled visas for eight judges on the bench. Mr Bolsonaro’s allies were left alone.
But foreign right-wingers seem to be the only ones Flávio can count on. At the convention in São Paulo that launched his candidacy on July 25th, Brazil’s other right-leaning parties were notably absent. Instead, he was backed by Mr Milei and the insults he hurled at Lula. Israel’s Binyamin Netanyahu, another Trump ally, offered a pre-recorded message. Flávio’s campaign took a mighty blow in May, when recordings leaked in which he can be heard asking for money from Daniel Vorcaro, the disgraced banker at the heart of Brazil’s largest-ever bank fraud. Flávio wanted the money for an English-language film about his father, “Dark Horse”, which is due to be released in September. The leaks caught Flávio in a lie, after he previously denied having a relationship with Mr Vorcaro. Flávio’s approval ratings plummeted. A public spat with his stepmother, Michelle, who is adored by Brazil’s powerful evangelical Christians, has also hurt. After the tiff, a close ally of the Bolsonaro family told a podcaster: “Statistically speaking, women tend to vote very badly, especially single women.” Among Brazil’s women, Lula leads Flávio by 18 percentage points. Centre-right parties dominate Congress. Their refusal to back Flávio may well be down to a calculation that Lula will be re-elected. His approval