rationing in over a dozen regions. Strikes on roads, bridges, railways and ferries into Crimea are starving the Russian-annexed peninsula, home to a massive military grouping, of the means to function. Ukraine’s mid-range drone operation has become the war’s defining trend this summer. Plans for a campaign attacking Russian logistics between 20km and 200km behind the front line have been in development since early 2025. But it came into being only in the second half of May, once Ukraine developed the units, doctrine, and types and numbers of drones required. Elon Musk’s agreement to end Russian forces’ Starlink satellite access opened new opportunities. “The moment we realised we had a chance was when we saw just how many air-defence systems we were destroying,” says Major Yevhen Karas, commander of the 413rd unmanned systems regiment. Major Karas, who played a key role in planning the operation, describes a recent mission above Crimea when his drones flew for over two hours without being intercepted. In the past three months Ukraine’s forces have destroyed over 70 air-defence systems—more than many countries possess in total—and inflicted losses that will take Russia years to replace. Ukraine is increasingly squeezing the supply routes into Crimea. A new generation of drones, some semi- automated, stalk petrol tankers and military vehicles on highways such as
the R-280 from Mariupol to Crimea. According to Ukraine, freight traffic on that road has fallen by 71% this year. But Crimea is not yet isolated. Those involved say that is months away, if at all possible. “Think of it as a plan for defence, rather than victory,” says Dmytro Pletenchuk, a Ukrainian navy spokesman. The main aim, he says, is to make it hard for Russia’s huge Crimean military grouping to operate. A Ukrainian intelligence source says the Russians have weeks of fuel reserves. “They have problems,” the source says, “but it isn’t yet decisive.” In Donbas, meanwhile, things are no walk in the park. Its hilly terrain limits drone operations. A dense web of roads links Russian troops to supply hubs in Russia. The rate of the Russian advance may have slowed, but infiltration by small groups continues. Pressure is building on Ukraine’s fortress belt in Donbas. There is fierce fighting in Kostyantynivka and near Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. A commander of an elite special-forces unit says Russia retains a marked advantage in men and munitions. “I see no sign of the enemy collapsing,” he says. Ukraine’s general staff puts Russia’s Ukraine grouping at 721,300, a drop of only 3,000 since the start of the year. Russia is outshelling Ukraine two to one, and sends up to 90 missiles and 300 guided bombs a day, weapons Ukraine mostly lacks. Mr Zelensky’s 40-day deadline is best understood as political theatre. Officials close to the presidential office suggest it is designed to dovetail with the next possible moment for negotiation. Talks are expected to move from back channels in August, when Russia’s high command (ie, Mr Putin) decides whether to commit to an autumn-winter campaign. Ukraine hopes that pressure on Crimea could push Mr Putin into serious negotiations. Failure to force a reckoning in August will let the war slide into the winter, with a renewed Russian campaign to destroy Ukraine’s energy grid. Then the pendulum may again swing away from Ukraine. The 40-day deadline, says a source involved in the Crimean drone operation, changes little on the ground. “But it is a crucial instrument in the cognitive war.”
Ukraine’s fake-it-till-you-make-it approach is well designed to buck up Ukrainians and to persuade an American president looking for “winners”. But it is more than propaganda. The shift in military standing is real, if oversold. And winning the information war has consequences. On June 26th the Russian-appointed head of Crimea declared a state of emergency. Russian nationalists are demanding Mr Putin respond. “I thought they would be screaming around July,” says Major Karas. “They started screaming at the end of May. Let’s see where they are in August.” ■ To stay on top of the biggest European stories, sign up to Café Europa, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//europe/2026/07/02/volodymyr-zelenskys-surge-is-a-bid-to- force-peace-talks
Is Germany’s government finally getting its act together? A new set of reforms has lifted sagging spirits in Berlin July 2nd 2026 THEY HAD cleared their diaries for three days, but in the end it took just eight hours. Late on July 1st the leaders of Germany’s ruling parties finalised a 34-point “programme for growth and employment” designed to lift the country’s sagging spirits, covering everything from reforms to the ailing public-pension system to liberalisation of Sunday-trading laws. The package alone is unlikely to zap life into a rapidly deindustrialising economy that has barely grown since 2019. In some respects it disappoints. But since Friedrich Merz, the chancellor, formed his centrist coalition just over a year ago, it has over-promised, underdelivered and squabbled endlessly. Some thought it might not survive. Now it has shown itself capable of comprehensive action. The sighs of relief were audible over Berlin.
“We want to get Germany back on track, and it is now clear that this is possible,” said Mr Merz on July 2nd. The parties backed a raft of measures to snip back the red tape that bedevils German business, including what Mr Merz called the “bureaucratic monster” of data-protection rules. They promised to back eu proposals to tackle subsidised Chinese exports. They also vowed to pass a law to forestall a plan by Die Linke, a hard-left party, to expropriate corporate landlords should it take power in Berlin in an election in September. The trickiest debate was over how to fulfil a promise of tax relief for Germany’s low- and middle-income earners. Around €10bn ($11bn) has been found, funded in part by the grudging acquiescence of Mr Merz’s conservative Christian Democrats (cdu) to raise taxes on those with incomes above €250,000—probably only around 150,000 people. Lars Klingbeil, finance minister and leader of the Social Democrats (spd), the junior coalition partner, had hoped for more. But the cdu and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, refused to raise taxes more broadly, or to take a scythe to Germany’s range of tax breaks and subsidies. The parties also agreed to allow firms to hire workers on fixed-term contracts for longer, and to raise the bar for taking sick days (Germany has one of the highest such absentee rates among its peers). These measures, says Annika von Mutius, ceo of Empion, an ai start-up, are “welcome and overdue”, though she laments the lack of reforms to Germany’s stringent hiring-and-firing rules. After months of false starts, there is a sense of momentum in Berlin. Next week parliament will tackle reforms to the wildly inefficient health-care system that should save €19bn next year. The cabinet is due soon to agree on changes to Germany’s long-term-care insurance system. Most importantly, the coalition agreed to implement in full the recommendations of a pension commission which reported last week. In Germany’s rapidly ageing society, these social-security costs threatened to spiral out of control. Tackling them was an urgent priority for employers. What explains the change? One figure close to Mr Merz credits two factors: the concentration of minds engendered by surging support for the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (afd), now leading in polls; and a wise
decision to outsource debates on the trickiest topics to experts whose reports politicians could not credibly reject. Notably, the coalition parties immediately backed the proposals of the pension commission, which include gradually lifting the retirement age to 70 and having state pension funds invest in private markets. The parties themselves would not have been capable of negotiating such an ambitious deal, say insiders. Still, Germany’s many veto players will have their say. Some state leaders are unhappy with elements of the pension and care proposals. The underwhelming tax tweaks will certainly irritate some in the spd. And every law agreed in cabinet must make its way through parliament: the coalition’s Bundestag majority of just 12 means success is hardly assured. Most seriously, elections in Germany’s east in September could bring the afd to power at the state level for the first time, which would send shock waves through the establishment. German officials have long claimed that the success of the afd, a party with no coherent policy platform, sprang in part from frustration with the inability of the government to get anything done. That claim can now be tested. ■ To stay on top of the biggest European stories, sign up to Café Europa, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//europe/2026/07/02/is-germanys-government-finally- getting-its-act-together
Europe’s airport queues are extremely long—and getting longer The continent’s border-control system is out of control July 2nd 2026 THE EUROPEAN UNION frets a lot about whether it is competitive, but in one sector it leads the world: acronyms that infuriate foreigners. In recent months the EU’s Entry-Exit Scheme (EES) has caused conniptions at the continent’s airports. Exasperated visitors (mostly Americans and Britons, for whom travel to Europe is supposed to be a visa-free breeze) have posted videos on Instagram and TikTok of spaghetti-like queues at passport control. The EES began its rollout last October, three years behind schedule. It was supposed to be fully implemented by April. The system is meant to make it easier to track non-EU visitors to the Schengen visa-free travel area, replacing passport stamps with a smooth IT system. Travellers must register