Turkey and Israel may be able to bury the hatchet once the Netanyahu and Erdogan eras are over. Turkish and Israeli officials like to say that the two countries, as Western-aligned non-Arab powers in the Middle East, have too much in common to remain at loggerheads. In the 1990s Turkey was Israel’s most valuable regional partner. But the angst goes beyond their current leaders. Israel sees Hakan Fidan, the Turkish foreign minister and a former spy chief who may succeed Mr Erdogan, as implacably anti-Israeli and claims he has strong ties to Iran. One Israeli intelligence analyst calls him “the most dangerous man for Israel in the region”. The prospect of open conflict between America’s closest ally and nato’s second-largest army seems far-fetched. But recent years have shown that wars once deemed unthinkable are possible. And the stakes could not be higher. ■ Sign up to the Middle East Dispatch, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop on a fascinating, complex and consequential part of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//middle-east-and-africa/2026/07/02/the-next-great-middle- east-rivalry
Middle East & Africa | The two Middle Easts Donald Trump’s hope for a new Middle East is premature Recent attacks underscore the limits of diplomacy between Iran and America July 2nd 2026 TWO PARALLEL Middle Easts exist. One is a hopeful realm of diplomacy. America and Iran are planning talks to implement the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed on June 17th. J.D. Vance, America’s vice- president, is eager to set up a hotline whereby the Pentagon can talk to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the regime’s elite defenders. Meanwhile Israel and Lebanon have signed their first formal diplomatic agreement in 43 years, which commits them to work towards a lasting peace. Then there is the real world. Iran is still attacking commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz and trading fire with America and its allies. Israel is still
bombing Lebanon, despite a nominal ceasefire, and occupying the south. Hizbullah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, is threatening a new civil war. For now, these two regions uneasily coexist: there will be both more jaw-jaw and more war-war. But recent days underscore how little progress diplomacy has made. The latest dust-up between America and Iran began on June 25th, when the IRGC attacked a Singapore-flagged container ship, the Ever Lovely, as it exited the Strait of Hormuz. The next day America bombed military targets in southern Iran, which, over the weekend, then fired missiles and drones at Bahrain and Kuwait. On June 28th the Americans signalled that the fighting was over and that vessels could “move freely” through the strait. The first part of the American claim is probably true. The tit-for-tat strikes were limited in size and scope—a violation of the ceasefire, yes, but a modest one. The second looks more dubious. With the usual shipping lanes through Hormuz blocked by mines, vessels must take one of two alternative routes. Iran demands that they use the northern passage through its territorial waters, which requires co-ordination with the IRGC. Last week, however, Oman and the International Maritime Organisation, a UN agency, started an effort to evacuate some 600 stranded vessels from the Persian Gulf that also uses the southern route, which goes through Omani waters. Though the MoU called for Hormuz to reopen within 30 days, Iran is bent on keeping its chokehold. The southern route threatens that control; hence the attack on the Ever Lovely, which was using it. A hotline would not have prevented conflict: there is little to discuss when America and Iran have incompatible goals in Hormuz. Oil markets shrugged off the incident. But traffic through Hormuz has dropped. At least 62 ships transited the day before the attack on the Ever Lovely, according to Windward, a shipping-analytics firm. That number fell to 42 on June 30th (and most used the northern route). While this was happening, Israel and Lebanon announced their deal on June 26th. On paper, it looks ambitious. It commits the Lebanese government to disarm Hizbullah. If it does, the Israeli army will conduct phased withdrawals from territory it occupies in southern Lebanon. It also seems at
odds with the MoU, which, at least in Iran’s reading, calls for a ceasefire and a full Israeli pull-out. America insists it does not—and the language is vague enough to support both claims. Seen from Jerusalem, the deal solves three immediate problems. First, it separates the two wars: Israel’s actions in Lebanon will be governed by this agreement, not the MoU. Second, withdrawing some troops would ease the strain on the Israeli army. Third, it helps Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, who faces a tough election this autumn. The accord does not specify a deadline for Israeli withdrawal; the process will probably take years. Mr Netanyahu can tell voters that Israel will maintain its presence in Lebanon for now. The deal is far more controversial in Lebanon. Critics say the lack of a timetable means it may wind up legitimising another long Israeli occupation. It also bars the Lebanese government from “hostile or adverse actions” against Israel at the UN or other international bodies, a remarkable concession from a sovereign state (Israel is similarly constrained). Supporters argue that direct talks with Israel are overdue, and that the alternative is to let Iran intercede on behalf of a militia—also an infringement of Lebanese sovereignty. Almost everyone is sceptical that the agreement will be implemented in full. This is hardly the first time conflict between Israel and Hizbullah has led to talk of disarming the militia. After the deal was signed Hassan Fadlallah, a Hizbullah MP, warned that Lebanon’s government could not enforce it “unless they go, with American support, to civil war”. Such threats resonate in a country that endured a ruinous sectarian conflict from 1975 until 1990. All of this may set back talks between America and Iran that are meant to reach a comprehensive nuclear deal within 60 days. On June 29th Iran’s foreign-ministry spokesman said there could be no direct talks until the MoU had been fully implemented—including the Lebanon bit. When the MoU was signed, American officials were ebullient about a new era in relations between America and Iran. Two weeks on, it looks much like the old one. ■
Sign up to the Middle East Dispatch, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop on a fascinating, complex and consequential part of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//middle-east-and-africa/2026/06/30/donald-trumps-hope- for-a-new-middle-east-is-premature
Meeting Jordan Bardella, France’s possible president America’s Balkan policy is all about gas Volodymyr Zelensky’s surge is a bid to force peace talks Is Germany’s government finally getting its act together? Europe’s airport queues are extremely long—and getting longer Happy birthday America, the ally Europe admires—questioningly
Meeting Jordan Bardella, France’s possible president The 30-year-old populist will run if Marine Le Pen is banned. Who is he? July 2nd 2026 The rue Gabriel Péri in Saint-Denis is typical of a northern Paris suburb. Skinned lambs’ heads are lined up in the butcher’s window; T-shirts in a wire basket go for €2 ($2.30) at a discount shop; bootleggers flog contraband cigarettes on the pavement. Here, in an eight-storey housing estate in the capital’s most populous banlieue, Jordan Bardella grew up. The 30-year-old’s journey from shy, pale-faced teenager to head of the populist- right National Rally (RN) is remarkable. On July 7th it could take a further twist: Marine Le Pen, his mentor, will learn whether an appeals court upholds her ban on running for office over misuse of European funds. If so, next April Mr Bardella will be the RN’s candidate for the French presidency.
“I was in no way destined to end up where I am today,” reflects Mr Bardella over coffee at the European Parliament, where he is an RN deputy. That the thought might have crossed his teenage mind, he says, is “impossible”. By his own admission “very shy” at that age, he spent hours in his bedroom playing “Call of Duty” or “FIFA”. He did not attend any of the schools that groom the French elite, and dropped out of university. In Parisian circles, among peers called Charles or Arthur, Mr Bardella was “taunted”, he says, over his working-class name: “I may have grown up ten minutes from the edge of Paris, but it was a different world.” Mr Bardella’s propulsion up the RN ranks is dizzying: he was a party member at 16, local hack at 18, head of the party’s list at European Parliament elections at 23 and elected RN president at 27. It was Ms Le Pen —the daughter of the party’s co-founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen—who made him her protégé, and promoted him improbably young. Today Mr Bardella is a celebrity; he even dates an Italian princess of the Bourbon-Two Sicilies ex- royal house. Polls suggest that if he were the candidate, as the two leaders have agreed if Ms Le Pen’s ban is upheld, he would lead first-round voting by a crushing margin—and could, possibly, win the run-off. In some ways, Mr Bardella’s appeal for the party is evident. He is the smooth face of a once antisemitic pariah party on a quest for respectability. Crucially, he does not carry the Le Pen name; helpfully, he comes from le 93, France’s poorest postcode. He is a slick performer who punctuates sentences with a smile, and prepares every appearance “very very very methodically”, says Alexandre Loubet, a friend and RN deputy. With over 2m followers on TikTok, Mr Bardella is as popular among teenagers as among pensioners. Since taking over the party, Mr Bardella has been laying out his vision: a MAGA-like anti-immigrant, green-sceptic, anti-woke nationalism, based on France-first principles. European diplomats who have met him are relieved that he calls Russia “a multidimensional threat” and would keep French armed forces in NATO operations. But he is firmly against Ukraine joining the EU, and wants in time to pull France out of NATO’s integrated military command. German officials were cautiously reassured by his recent hint at co-operation with Berlin, notably on migration. Yet Mr Bardella’s ambition to remake the EU into a “union of nations” involves policies, such as