Years later, the picture—and its leaking—still makes high-ranking Japanese officials wince. In Tokyo it is argued that whenever allies isolate Mr Trump, they are not showing independence, but committing an act of self-harm. As another G7 is held in France, from June 15th to 17th, a divide can be seen between American allies in Europe and those in Asia. European politicians and citizens rather like it when America looks lonely or weak, for they resent Mr Trump as a bully. Increasingly, they talk of a need to stand up to two predatory superpowers, America and China, and of middle powers co-operating to uphold a benign and equitable rules-based order. That was the vision offered by Mark Carney, Canada’s prime minister, when he addressed the World Economic Forum in Davos in January. Mr Carney enthused about mid-size countries forming coalitions of the willing to defend their values and resist economic coercion by great powers. The audience, thrilled to hear America and China being bashed, gave him a standing ovation. In Tokyo the Carney pitch is seen as an embarrassing fantasy. There is head- shaking dismay, too, at the thought that Europeans and Canadians could possibly believe that Mr Trump and China’s Xi Jinping pose comparable threats to their security, prosperity and autonomy. The claim is adolescent in its daftness. Asian allies are wary of foreign policies based on values. More concretely, Japanese elites have no interest in joining any coalition that purports to free middle powers from their dependence on America and China alike. They fear a China that has grown strong and is now making its move. Japan is on the front line, while its giant neighbour amasses military firepower and uses its dominance of rare earths and other industrial inputs to hold other economies to ransom. To Japanese eyes, China is pursuing regional and quite possibly global dominance and only America has the clout to contain it. Japan longs for the allies to get serious. Well-meaning middle powers are not about to deter China from an attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, rogues are on the march, some of them in lockstep. Among them are Japan’s neighbours Russia and North Korea. Nobody expects Europeans or Canada to ride to the
rescue. Australia is spoken of fondly, but with no illusions about its limited might. Mr Carney and friends should worry that Japan does not buy their plan for middle powers to save the world. For if a coalition of middling countries ever did take shape, Japan would be one of its natural leaders. Though greying fast, the country still has 123m people and the world’s fourth-largest economy. It boasts some world-class technology and engineering firms and a shipbuilding industry. Its armed forces are being strengthened, testing to breaking-point the post-1945 shibboleth that Japan maintains only self- defence forces. It is a supplier of new and second-hand warships to Asia- Pacific governments that fear China. It rescued a trans-Pacific trade pact after America abandoned it. Closer to home, Japan is cautiously deepening defence and security ties with South Korea. The south has not forgotten the crimes committed during Japan’s occupation of Korea. But nor can it ignore the dangers posed by North Korea, its fanatical, nuclear-armed poor cousin. While other democratic incumbents are stalked by populists, Japan’s prime minister, Takaichi Sanae, in February led her mainstream party to a thumping majority. That has not stopped Chinese propagandists from calling Ms Takaichi a fascist warmonger, after she suggested that Japan’s pacifist constitution would not preclude defending Taiwan in a conflict. Other governments study how Japan has laboured (with partial success) to reduce its dependence on China for rare-earth minerals and other inputs. For all those strengths, Japan still needs America. There is no Plan B, is the line in Tokyo. If Japan can be glimpsed hedging against a less reliable America, for instance by making more of its own weapons, that is called Plan A with an asterisk. Mr Trump or his successors cannot be allowed to weaken their commitment to Asia. Nor does the region have a better alternative to America’s nuclear umbrella. The game is to show why Japan is indispensable to America’s prosperity and technological primacy. In the past, Japanese politicians would arrive in Washington spouting bromides about liberty and democracy. Now, they brag of helping America to build an AI tech stack that will leave China in the dust.
To be sure, Japanese elites shudder when MAGA attacks American institutions: plenty of them studied at Ivy League schools. But as an ally, Japan is patient and unemotional. To Europeans or Canadians who see Americans as kin, Trumpian aggression feels like a betrayal. In Japan America is not family: it is the superpower that defeated then helped to rebuild the country. Against that, Japan has more to lose than many Western allies do. If America left Asia, very quickly Japan and its neighbours would have to accommodate China in unwelcome and wrenching ways. It would much rather do whatever it takes to keep America close. It is all very pragmatic. Other allies should take note, and grow up.■ Subscribers to The Economist can sign up to our Opinion newsletter, which brings together the best of our leaders, columns, guest essays and reader correspondence. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//international/2026/06/16/asian-allies-are-doomed-to-hug- donald-trump-close
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America’s carmakers cannot escape Chinese EVs for ever Can they stay relevant? June 18th 2026 The Art Deco skyscrapers of downtown Detroit, built when money flooded into the Motor City in the 1920s, attest to the early years of America’s long dominance of carmaking. Though the industry’s centre of gravity has shifted to China, the stamp of the “Big Three” on Detroit endures. This year General Motors (GM) opened swish new headquarters. Last year Ford moved house within its home suburb of Dearborn. The American base of Stellantis, of which Chrysler Group is now part (and whose biggest shareholder, Exor, part-owns The Economist’s parent company), is still in Auburn Hills, another suburb.
Signs of confidence, or a circling of the wagons? America’s tariffs and regulatory fixes have favoured gas-guzzlers over the electric vehicles gaining popularity elsewhere. Detroit dominates the making of the giant pickup trucks and monster SUVs that Americans love, and which are highly profitable. But in relying on petrol power behind protectionist barriers, America’s carmakers risk falling behind competitors—mainly from China— in an industry that evs will one day take over. The Big Three have a recent “history of retrenchment”, says Philippe Houchois of Jefferies, a bank. In 1950 three-quarters of the world’s cars were made in America; now barely an eighth are. GM quit Europe in 2017, selling chronically lossmaking Opel to Groupe PSA, now part of Stellantis. Ford’s share of the European market collapsed after it discontinued popular smaller models and failed to excite motorists with its evs. In China, ultra- competitive locals have routed both GM, whose market share has fallen by roughly half in a decade, and Ford, which has lost two-thirds. In 2004 GM was the world’s biggest carmaker, selling 8.4m vehicles. Last year it was fourth, with 6.2m. Ford has slid from third to seventh. Even at home, the Big Three’s share has dwindled from over 90% in 1965 to 40% or so. Stellantis, a mix of American and European brands formed by the merger of Fiat-Chrysler and PSA in 2021, sold just 1.3m cars in America last year, less than half the tally in 2004. The supposed safety of insulation from the forces reshaping the industry— electrification and the rise of China—has come at a price. Joe Biden’s administration imposed 100% tariffs on Chinese evs in 2024, shutting out the cars that have rapidly taken nearly a tenth of the European market. Donald Trump’s rolling-back of Mr Biden’s emissions regulations and subsidies for EVs has allowed America’s carmakers to ease up on electrification. But past bullishness on EVs has been costly. Ford wrote down nearly $20bn last year and Stellantis $26bn, mostly for scaling back EV plans; GM took an $8bn hit. Mr Trump’s trade policies have also hurt. Past free-trade deals encouraged shifting production of cars and parts to Mexico and Canada. Now hefty tariffs on non-American content, intended to bring manufacturing home, have cost Detroit billions. A renegotiation of the latest agreement, due to
begin in July, may require even greater American content of vehicles to qualify for tariff-free trade, potentially raising costs further. Still, in the past year the share prices of Ford and GM have surged (see chart): investors prize the short-term chance to sell petrol vehicles in America for longer. Stellantis, whose shares have shed 30% since Antonio Filosa became its boss last June, is placing a similar bet. A plan unveiled on May 21st proposes that 60% of the €36bn ($42bn) to be invested in its brands in the next four years go to North America, where returns will be greatest. Analysts welcomed the plan, but question whether it can be put into practice. To focus on the world’s largest car market after China is not exactly daft, even if it has shrunk by around 1m vehicles since the pandemic—to 16m a year—and growth will be sluggish at best. “Our international footprint is smaller than it was historically,” says Paul Jacobson, GM’s chief financial officer, “so we’re primarily focused on our strongest market, North America, and also regions like South America and China.” There is scant foreign competition for the biggest money-spinners, and so far electrification of these has been unsuccessful. Ford discontinued its F-150 Lightning, an electric version of its bestselling pickup, in 2025. gm and Stellantis have scrapped plans to make their big pickups in EV form.