Middle East & Africa | Out in the cold The end of the war in Iran threatens “glorious failure” for Israel Donald Trump’s deal with Iran leaves America’s ally without any strategic gains June 18th 2026 ON FEBRUARY 28TH hundreds of American and Israeli warplanes took off simultaneously to launch the opening salvo of their war on Iran. For 40 days the two allies’ military partnership was intense and close. But with the agreement by Donald Trump and Iran’s leaders meant to bring their war to an end, the nature of that partnership has shifted. Israel has been shut out of the negotiations with Iran. And the agreement signed between America and Iran on June 17th deals with few, if any, of Israel’s concerns. The outcome for Israel is, as one of the country’s diplomats in Jerusalem describes it, “a glorious failure”. It is also a personal blow to Israel’s prime

minister, Binyamin Netanyahu. He has invested enormous political capital in convincing America’s president that a war with Iran could fundamentally change the situation in the Middle East for the better, perhaps even topple the Islamic Republic’s regime. Despite Mr Netanyahu’s claims, and the serious damage inflicted on Iran, the regime is still standing. Indeed, hardliners have been empowered. The deal does not immediately tackle Iran’s nuclear programme, Israel’s greatest concern. Iran retains the capability to fire ballistic missiles at Israel, the rest of the Middle East and beyond. The agreement with America does not refer to Iran’s missile programme. Nor does it address one of Israel’s other great worries: Iran’s network of regional proxies. The most powerful of these, Hizbullah, the Shia militia in Lebanon, gains new protection from Israeli attacks in the deal. Israel tried to scupper the truce hours before it was announced when it attacked a target in Beirut, after Hizbullah had launched more drones. But instead of derailing negotiations, as Mr Netanyahu clearly desired, the attack only encouraged Mr Trump to seal the deal. Israel’s defence minister insisted that troops would remain in the “security zones” that it has captured in southern Lebanon, but the accord between America and Iran stipulates that America’s allies, namely Israel, end the war in Lebanon. Israel can no longer rely on its ally’s backing over this. The American president gave a series of interviews in which he said he was “so pissed off” with his erstwhile partner for having “no fucking judgment” in launching the strike on Beirut and described him as “a very difficult guy”. An Israeli official previously stationed in Washington said that “a large part of the problem is that we no longer have the same kind of relationship with America in which officials spoke openly to each other at all levels. Now it has all been subsumed by the connection between Netanyahu and Trump and their personal dramas.” More fundamentally, Israel’s and America’s goals in Iran have become less aligned. A few in Israel’s defence and intelligence establishment warned

their generals of this discrepancy in the first days of the war. But their bosses were swept away by the success of early air strikes and backed Mr Netanyahu through the war. Then Mr Trump called time. He was more interested in dealing with the same regime that Israel wanted to bring down. Since then, Israel has been left out in the cold. Confronting Iran has been Mr Netanyahu’s idée fixe for years. He has led Israel twice into wars with that intention. Although these campaigns caused significant damage to Iran’s nuclear and missiles programmes, that could prove temporary. Israel has damaged its crucial ties with America and its relations with Arab countries that saw it as an ally against Iran. All this is also likely to hurt Mr Netanyahu’s prospects of re-election in October. It will be hard to sell himself as the guarantor of Israel’s security when he appears to have achieved so little over Iran. Nor can he afford to be seen at loggerheads with Mr Trump. He has made much of his relationship with the president, who has been very popular in Israel. That said, the main opposition leaders were just as gung-ho when war began. Their criticism is that Mr Netanyahu failed to get results, not that he launched it. “We desperately need a new Iran policy,” says a military planner. For now, Israel has no prospect of one. ■ Sign up to the Middle East Dispatch, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop on a fascinating, complex and consequential part of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//middle-east-and-africa/2026/06/16/the-end-of-the-war-in- iran-threatens-glorious-failure-for-israel

Middle East & Africa | Third time unlucky The Iran war meant an economic crisis for Africa It was the third shock of the 2020s to hit the continent June 18th 2026 At the start of the year there was cautious optimism about Africa’s economies. The imf forecast that gdp growth for Africa as a whole would be the fastest for a decade. Inflation was cooling. The continent seemed to be getting over the macroeconomic after-effects of two global crises earlier in the decade: covid-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But then America and Israel launched their war against Iran. A peace deal (of sorts) has now been signed, but the conflict has already harmed most of Africa’s 54 countries. It has raised fuel prices, stoking inflation and crimping spending power. It will probably lead to higher food prices. Some places may see macroeconomic crises—and thus political crises too. But the main effect will be to sap the momentum seen earlier in

the year, making it harder for Africa to close its economic gap with the rest of the world. More expensive fuel is the clearest impact of the war. Oil prices dropped on news of the agreement between America and Iran but it may take months for energy markets to fully normalise. Prices will remain high, especially compared with January, even if they are lower than at the war’s peak. Shipments of refined products may be slow to arrive and some African countries are very short of stocks. Most African governments have allowed at least some of the higher oil prices to flow to the pump. That reflects economic reality. On average they would need to spend nearly 1% of gdp to negate the effects of higher oil prices, says the Centre for Global Development, a think-tank. But before the war the imf put the median fiscal deficit in sub-Saharan Africa at 3.2%. Over a third of countries spend at least 15% of revenues on interest payments. Higher petrol prices mean costlier commutes, whether in cars, minibuses or motorcycle taxis. Dearer fares mean less disposable income for everything else. Costlier diesel, the lifeblood of African industry, is squeezing firms’ margins. It powers freight operators, food wholesalers and haulage trucks at mines. Since diesel is crucial to power generation in many countries, it is also leading to rises in electricity bills across the continent. Food inflation in Africa is a “delayed fuse”, argues s&p. The credit-rating agency reckons that it will take six to 18 months for it to hit consumers because there is a lag to the effect of higher fertiliser prices caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-third of global fertiliser exports passed. Many agri-businesses bought their fertiliser for the current planting season at pre-war prices, so the effects on margins and food prices will come next year. A swift reopening of the strait may limit the damage, but bottlenecks and logistical issues will keep fertiliser costs above pre-war levels for next season.

For now, bumper global grain harvests are keeping a lid on prices. “The situation is very different from the challenges posed by the Russia-Ukraine war,” says Wandile Sihlobo, an agricultural economist and adviser to Cyril Ramaphosa, South Africa’s president. “The impact...will be more apparent in 2027, going into 2028.” The macroeconomic fallout will be varied. Oil exporters such as Nigeria and Angola will reap higher tax revenues. High metal prices will cushion the blow of pricier fuel in countries such as Congo. Countries with relatively low debt and inflation, such as Tanzania, look more robust. Others are more vulnerable. In forecasts published on June 11th, the World Bank downgraded its 2026 growth projections for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole from 4.3% to 4.0%. The five African countries “most exposed” to the Iran war, says s&p (of the 20-plus sovereigns it rates), are Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique and Rwanda. All are energy importers. All depend in some way on external financing. In Kenya foreign-exchange reserves are being “rapidly denuded”, notes a veteran Kenyan banker. Ahead of elections next year, imf-imposed spending restraints will make it tricky for the government to buy votes. But in April William Ruto, Kenya’s president, agreed on a new $600m loan with the World Bank, suggesting he may have to turn to the Fund as well. “We don’t exactly have the muscle, so to speak, to tell the imf to get lost,” adds the banker. Meanwhile, many Kenyans are telling their leaders to do just that. As fuel prices rose, the country saw deadly protests and a nationwide transport strike. More are likely: Mr Ruto has said he has no room to prevent further fuel-price increases and ruled out more fuel-tax cuts. Analysts are watching a finance bill going through parliament that contains some of the measures that sparked mass protests—and a violent crackdown by authorities—in 2024. Senegal offers further evidence of the Iran war’s political impact. For several months the country has scrambled to find cash to avoid defaulting on debt that the imf reckons is 130% of gdp. Generous fuel subsidies that are now even more lavish are making that task harder. Bassirou Diomaye Faye,