Leydy Diossa-Jiménez, a political sociologist at the University of Michigan, says that “you cannot detach voting preferences of Colombians abroad from the historical causes of their exit.” Colombians in Europe historically may have been victims of right-wing paramilitary forces, whereas those in America fled armed violence from left-wing guerrillas. Mr Sabatini says many Colombian expats blame the deterioration of their country on “leftist guerrillas, and most recently Petro’s naive plan of total peace”. The “hothouse environment for politics” in Florida, where many Colombians in the diaspora are concentrated, “tends to reinforce these tendencies”. Polling stations opened to the diaspora for the run-off vote on June 15th. Unless their turnout rises dramatically, they probably will not sway this election. Nor will their votes be particularly visible. In Peru, where the diaspora can only vote on election day, votes from abroad were naturally counted last. They tipped the conservative Keiko Fujimori to a wafer-thin victory in the presidential run-off on June 7th. The Colombian diaspora results, on the other hand, are released alongside the general vote. Still, if registration and turnout keep growing as they have in the past, Colombians abroad could become a powerful bloc in the 53m-strong country. ■ Sign up to El Boletín, our subscriber-only newsletter on Latin America, to understand the forces shaping a fascinating and complex region.
This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//the-americas/2026/06/18/the-colombian-diaspora-is- overwhelmingly-right-wing
The Gen-Z streamer from Medellín influencing Colombia’s election Algorithms, not debates, will determine the country’s next president June 18th 2026 “If Pablo Escobar had said to you, ‘I need a lawyer,’ what would you have replied?” Some reporters might have avoided asking such a pointed question of the man who may be Colombia’s next president. Yet WestCol (real name Luis Fernando Villa) is not shy. The tattooed 25-year-old from Medellín bills himself as Latin America’s biggest streamer. Abelardo de la Espriella, the right-wing populist presidential candidate and former lawyer who has defended swindlers and paramilitaries, draws the line at the notorious drug lord. “I’m a man of law, of argument and conversations,” he told WestCol. Mr de la Espriella is not the only politician who sat down with WestCol during Colombia’s presidential campaign. Mr Villa has livestreamed to his
15m followers from the estate of Álvaro Uribe, an influential right-wing former president, and has done the same “sin filtro” from the Casa de Nariño, the official residence of the outgoing leftist incumbent, Gustavo Petro. “I’m going to ask him for tips on how I could become president,” quipped Mr Villa, who has become an unlikely kingmaker for young Colombians wondering who to vote for in the run-off on June 21st. Politics is not Mr Villa’s usual fare, but it is popular. Some 700,000 viewers tuned in to watch his two-hour chat with Mr de la Espriella on May 30th, the day before the first-round vote. Forced from his home at a young age by guerrillas, Mr Villa grew up on the streets of Medellín. He made his name streaming video games, before expanding into nightclubs, restaurant chains, boxing and merchandise. He now promotes music with J Balvin, Colombian reggaeton royalty. His success inspires many Colombian youths who feel the system is rigged against them. “I never thought I’d have the watches I have today,” he muses. “People you do business with take you a little more seriously.” Podcasters like Joe Rogan popularised the cosy-but-candid interview format during elections in the United States in 2024. Mr Villa operates in the same spirit of the “manosphere”; in 2022 he got into legal trouble for content he published about transgender people, who are a protected class under Colombian law. Through Mr Villa, Mr de la Espriella was no doubt hoping to reach young voters, 70% of whom plumped for Mr Petro in the run-off in 2022. It seems to be working. Only about 60% of those aged 18-25 voted for Iván Cepeda, the hard-left ally of Mr Petro, in the first round. That proportion might have been bigger had Mr Cepeda agreed to an interview with Mr Villa. (He cancelled at the last minute, claims the streamer.) He insists his content is neutral. Positioning himself as an outsider wins followers in Colombia, where 75% of people say they mistrust mainstream news providers. New forms of media have defined the campaign. For the first time in a Colombian election, candidates, including Mr de la Espriella, have deployed AI-generated videos. His attacked the “same old” politicians, highlighting his anti-establishment credentials, capturing the attention of voters who are angry with what they see as the corrupt, inept political elite.
Mr Cepeda is a Luddite by comparison. He prefers to make speeches in town squares. His path to victory, which depends on winning over centrists and voters who abstained in the first round, looks increasingly narrow. On June 11th he filed criminal complaints against Mr de la Espriella, alleging ties to murderous paramilitary groups. Critics see this as a last-ditch effort to rescue a failing campaign. Mr Petro is another brake on Mr Cepeda, who is not helped by the outgoing president’s frequent interventions. Mr Petro is also being investigated for illegally meddling in the election. “Petro doesn’t want Cepeda to win,” says Miguel Silva, a seasoned political analyst. He wants to be “the sole leader of the left…protesting in the streets, against the system”. In a survey of Colombians last year, a moderate-minded half said they would vote for neither the extreme left nor right. Yet many did. The centre is failing. Colombia may soon herald a roaring triumph for a populist with TikTok-friendly taglines. ■ Sign up to El Boletín, our subscriber-only newsletter on Latin America, to understand the forces shaping a fascinating and complex region. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//the-americas/2026/06/18/the-gen-z-streamer-from- medellin-influencing-colombias-election
The real winner in Myanmar’s civil war is China Myanmar’s junta revives a hated dam to court China From Philippine staple to global sensation: the rise of ube Taiwan’s opposition leader faced a tough crowd in America The problem with Narendra Modi’s airport-building frenzy
The real winner in Myanmar’s civil war is China It doesn’t want to fix the war-torn country but is fine managing it June 18th 2026 WHEN MIN AUNG HLAING, then chief of Myanmar’s army, led a coup in February 2021, China called it “a major cabinet reshuffle”. On June 16th Xi Jinping, China’s leader, needed no euphemisms to justify meeting Mr Min Aung Hlaing on his first visit to Beijing as Myanmar’s president. It was a clear political endorsement from China of a sham election in December and January—held during a civil war with no big opposition parties and won overwhelmingly by an army-backed party. Mr Min Aung Hlaing will have relished being welcomed as a head of state, as he was earlier this month in India. The election has not fully ended his status as the pariah leader of a pariah regime. But he is making progress. The regional club, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, still bars him
from its summits, but is split between members that want to continue to shut out his junta and those tempted to make moves to accommodate it. America, which once led the campaign to isolate him, has drifted into indifference. A year ago, the junta was delighted by a letter from Donald Trump threatening Myanmar with tariffs of 40% on its exports, because it named the general and so could be taken as implicit recognition of him. Since, America has quietly lifted sanctions on several of his cronies. Meanwhile, the feeding of USAID, America’s aid agency, into the woodchipper has forced ordinary people in Myanmar to rely on the junta’s hospitals and news outlets. The regime has leant on a narrow set of patrons: Russia and China for diplomatic cover at the United Nations, as well as aircraft, the fuel to fly them, and drones and drone-jamming kit, lending it a technological advantage in the civil war; China and Thailand for revenues from exports of Myanmar’s natural gas. China is Myanmar’s largest foreign investor. In return, the generals offer what China wants: access to the Indian Ocean, allowing Chinese trade to bypass the potential choke-point of the Malacca Strait. Relations are transactional. Over the past year China has used its sway over powerful rebel groups on the shared border to help the junta. Several have signed ceasefire agreements and handed territory to the army. Not all the battlefield gains can be attributed to China’s help—a conscription drive begun in 2024 has swelled the army’s ranks past 100,000. The junta has pushed forward across the country, taking towns in northern Sagaing province in April and May. As the rainy season begins, the army will almost certainly advance further, says Anthony Davis, a security analyst who studies the conflict. Its troops are moving towards trading posts in areas currently controlled by rebels along Myanmar’s borders with India, Thailand and China. This is ominous for the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), an ethnic armed organisation that controls much of northern Myanmar but not Myitkyina, capital of Kachin state. Together Myanmar and China produce around 90% of the world’s heavy rare earths, says Jason Bedford of the East Asia
Institute at the National University of Singapore. Nearly half of the world’s supply of these elements, used in electric vehicles, defence technology and satellites, comes from KIA-controlled mines. The ore is then shipped to China for processing. China has long been pragmatic in its dealings with Myanmar, control of which is splintered between the junta, the KIA and other rebel groups, each dependent on Chinese markets, weapons routes and goodwill. China is the indispensable broker to all of them. It can exert pressure on the KIA by threatening to stop buying its rare earths or jade, by choking the routes through which it buys weapons, or by detaining leaders who live on the Chinese side of the border. And it can put pressure on the junta through the very trade and investment Mr Min Aung Hlaing went to China to court. This leverage is not the same as control. Myanmar remains a low priority in the Chinese Communist Party’s global calculations—an irritating border problem to manage, not a project to finish. China wants the rare earths flowing, its pipelines and railways open and a south-western frontier stable enough to stem the spillage of refugees, drugs and scams across it. It does not need a unified Myanmar for any of that; it needs a Myanmar where it is the one party that every side must deal with.