(long enraged by Ethiopia’s mega-dam on the Nile) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (tplf), which rules Tigray and fought a war against Mr Abiy (then allied with Eritrea) between 2020 and 2022. Besides threatening shipping in the Red Sea, a war between Eritrea and Ethiopia could also merge into the civil war next door in Sudan, where the two back opposing sides. To avert such a disaster, America appears to be using both carrots and sticks to convince the two countries to talk to each other. On May 11th it lifted an arms embargo on Ethiopia. It then signed a deal on security co-operation. But America has also warned Ethiopia that it opposes any military action against Eritrea. Lifting sanctions on Eritrea could be a sweetener for Mr Isaias. “The Americans are working really hard to get Isaias to agree to some kind of rapprochement [with Abiy],” says a senior Ethiopian official. “If Isaias [has any sense,] then he will have to say yes.” The strategy may be working. In October Mr Abiy said the Eritrean port of Assab “rightfully belongs” to Ethiopia and vowed to build a naval base there. More recently, his underlings have told Western diplomats that commercial access to the port might suffice. Mr Isaias is understood to have conveyed that he is open to talks, if Eritrea’s sovereignty is guaranteed. “Isaias is ruthless, but rational,” says a former Western diplomat. “He is beginning to act as the adult in the room.” But few trust that Mr Abiy has given up on capturing Assab. And if Mr Isaias thinks that sooner or later Ethiopia will strike, he may try to topple his nemesis first. The tplf would also love to unseat Mr Abiy, as would the Fano, another Ethiopian rebel group sponsored by Mr Isaias. Sudan’s army would probably help. Egypt is doling out guns and egging everyone on. Tigray is the flashpoint. Mr Abiy has starved it of cash, fuel and medicine. The tplf is threatening war. “We have access to Eritrea [and] to Sudan,” says a tplf insider. “Co-ordination is going to be automatic.” On June 5th Ethiopia bombed Tigrayan troops on the border with Eritrea. Hundreds of Tigrayan soldiers were reportedly killed or injured. Mr Isaias’s showdown with Mr Abiy may not have started. But if this is peace, who needs a war? ■
Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//middle-east-and-africa/2026/06/11/could-eritrea-come-in- from-the-cold
Middle East & Africa | No, he won’t go Fighting in Mogadishu risks making a weak state weaker A presidential power grab has convulsed Somali politics June 11th 2026 Cranes dot the skyline of Mogadishu, where in recent years construction has boomed instead of bombs. There was talk of Somalia’s capital “rising from the ashes”. But on June 4th it seemed like the bad old days were back, as heavy gunfire erupted across town. In a northern district, a group of young men ran for cover behind a newly built apartment. An rpg had punched a gaping hole through its gleaming roof. Bullets flew because ballots flopped. In 2022 Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was sworn in as Somalia’s president. His four-year term expired on May 15th, but he has refused to step down. In March Mr Mohamud’s government rammed a last-minute constitutional overhaul through parliament, extending
his term by a year. Yet much of the opposition boycotted the vote and regards the reforms as an illegitimate power grab. The fighting in Mogadishu pitted soldiers loyal to Mr Mohamud against militias controlled by two prominent opposition figures. The un says at least nine people were killed and hundreds displaced. The government claimed to have “restored order” on June 5th, but the situation remains tense. There is more than a hint of déjà vu in this. Mr Mohamud’s predecessor in Villa Somalia, the presidential palace, also tried to extend his term. Somalia- watchers speak wryly of “Villawood”: a recurring soap opera staged every election cycle by the country’s politicians. The plot is familiar: as his term draws to a close, the president says he needs more time to fix Somalia once and for all. His rivals denounce him as a would-be dictator and rally militias to thwart his nefarious plans. The melodrama usually ends with an improvised bargain, lubricated by a dollop of donor funds. But not before a short gunfight in the capital. Yet the latest Villawood blockbuster could go dangerously off-script. Since 2012 Somali presidents have been elected indirectly by clan elders. Mr Mohamud’s reforms mandate the introduction of one-person-one-vote elections. The government argues, rightly, that the status quo is undemocratic; a shift to universal suffrage is long overdue. But the commission that is to oversee the election is in effect under Mr Mohamud’s thumb. A large portion of Somalia’s political class, including two of its six federal member-states (excluding Somaliland), has refused to participate in the vote for that reason. Both sides seem loth to make concessions. “We can discuss the technical details,” says a minister in Mr Mohamud’s government. “But we cannot compromise the right of the Somali people to choose their leaders directly.” “How can you [negotiate] with someone who wanted to spill your blood?” counters a source close to an opposition figure involved in the recent clashes. Western donors might once have helped broker a deal. But these days they are cutting funding and losing leverage. Talks convened by Britain and America in May collapsed without an agreement. More recently Turkey has been trying to mediate. Yet some opposition figures accuse it of being partial to Mr Mohamud. Under his watch it has
dramatically expanded its military and commercial footprint in Somalia. Some observers worry that if he feels he has Turkish backing, Mr Mohamud may seek confrontation rather than compromise. In March the president reportedly used Turkish drones and Turkish-trained commandos to unseat a recalcitrant regional governor. “If I have a single bullet left,” warned an opposition leader on June 3rd, “any man that fires at me, I’ll fire back at him.” Even if serious violence is avoided, the stand-off risks further enfeebling an already wobbly state. The opposition may organise its own elections, fracturing the country between parallel administrations and making it even harder to beat back a resurgent al-Shabab, a jihadist group that controls much of the countryside. When Mr Mohamud took office he promised to unite and calm Somalia. He may instead be hastening its fragmentation. ■ Sign up to the Analysing Africa, a weekly newsletter that keeps you in the loop about the world’s youngest—and least understood—continent. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//middle-east-and-africa/2026/06/11/fighting-in-mogadishu- risks-making-a-weak-state-weaker
A trade war between the EU and China seems inevitable Why Turkey likes NATO again Ukraine is transplanting its industrial heart to the west Ukrainian strikes are inflicting pain deep inside Russia Armenia’s election is a setback for Vladimir Putin Ukraine’s war is now longer than the first world war
A trade war between the EU and China seems inevitable Europe sees Chinese subsidies, China sees European weakness June 11th 2026 Thucydides thought rising powers tend to cause conflict. Had he been an economist looking at the explosion of Chinese exports to Europe, he might have expected a trade war. So do many analysts these days. The question is no longer whether Europe will pull up some drawbridges, but how many and how fast, and how it will deal with the consequences. The stakes are clear. Bankruptcies in the European Union have risen to levels last seen in 2015. Germany lost 143,000 jobs in industry in 2025. In most of Europe growth is sluggish and industrial production declining. In France and Germany hard-right parties lead the polls. At a summit on June
18th EU leaders will discuss how to cope with the Chinese challenge, in an increasingly dire global economy. Is China really behind Europe’s economic problems? The EU’s trade deficit in goods with China was about €1bn ($1.16bn) a day in 2025, roughly double the figure before the pandemic. Germany especially has seen a constant rise in imports from China and a steep decline in exports going there. Some see foul play. The OECD, a club of mostly rich countries, found Chinese firms got three to eight times more subsidies between 2005 and 2024 than competitors in OECD countries. Some would fail without them: 32% of industrial firms in China lose money. Those sceptical of blaming China argue that Europe’s high energy costs, slow bureaucracies and failure to innovate or integrate are the true culprits. Worse, hampering imports of Chinese materials and parts would harm Europe’s downstream businesses. That could hurt competitiveness more than it helps. The list of protected “strategic” sectors is already long. France, which is hosting a G7 summit on June 15th, is emphasising macroeconomic imbalances. China’s currency is undervalued by between 15% and 30%, making its exports cheaper. But the deeper cause is its surplus of savings over investment, the flip side of any export surplus, which protectionism can do little about, except to force the exports elsewhere. Awkwardly, Europeans know this model well. Germany perfected it in the 2010s, and its current-account surplus is still 4.5% of GDP, in the same ballpark as China’s. Even so, the EU has hit back. On April 21st it let Lisbon go ahead with a light-rail project only after a Chinese-owned contractor that it said received subsidies was replaced by a Polish one. An investigation into subsidies on electric vehicles led to tariffs in 2024. Tariffs on steel were adopted on June 8th. Last year the bloc barred public procurement of medical devices from China, in retaliation for Chinese exclusion of European ones. The list goes on.