The third reason for Europe’s digital sovereignty drive is growth. Europe is losing the technological race against America and China, including in AI, which reaches into many sectors where Europe remains strong. Building domestic providers is seen as necessary to stay competitive. One question is whether users will be able to switch. Hyperscalers provide integrated services and the scale to make them efficient. “That bundling of services then leads to lock-in effects,” says Svea Windwehr of D64, a digital-progress association in Germany: users cannot count on easily taking data with them. Quality and cost also matter. A survey of Danish firms, which use clouds more than any others in Europe, found that their top concerns (after security and legal compliance) were quality, ease of use and price. That often argues for American providers. So does the fact that European firms’ customers tend to use American tech, too. “For many industrial applications,” says a European industrial executive, “there are no capable alternatives to software-as-a-service from American providers.” “Europe’s challenge is one of industrial co-ordination and animal spirits,” argues Georg Riekeles of the European Policy Centre, a think-tank in Brussels. There is demand for sovereign solutions, industry representatives say. But building an ecosystem, from chips to data centres and services, is hard. America’s strong economic momentum makes it harder still. Anne Hidma of ASML, the Dutch-based company that leads the world in the machines that make chips (but which sells only 1% of its machines in Europe), says Europeans start with their strong suit, innovative technical ideas. Then they see whether there is a market for them. In contrast, “America starts from the end market and builds its ecosystem from there,” she says. To get things moving, the EU wants to help build large data centres and strengthen the supply chain for chipmaking. The forthcoming package will probably include faster permitting procedures, some public funds to support investment and procurement rules that prioritise European suppliers. The hope is that this will create demand both for chip design and manufacturing, and for cloud and AI services made in Europe. It is a tall order. ■
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Bre-entry may be the next drama to grip the European Union An old friend comes knocking May 21st 2026 Picture the scene, some time in the 2030s. Three dozen leaders of the European Union’s member states crowd around a gilded desk in some history-laden hall—perhaps in Versailles, Sarajevo or Rome. The Spanish prime minister signs a thick vellum document, before passing the Mont Blanc pen to the German chancellor, then the Ukrainian president. The mood is jovial as, one by one, signatures are affixed on “The Treaty of Accession of the United Kingdom to the European Union (version 2.0)”. As the pen makes its way to the French president, she seems to waver for a second, perhaps recalling past tabloid headlines about bendy bananas and budget rebates. Finally it is the turn of the British prime minister of the day. In one stroke Brexit is reversed; the only member to have left the EU’s embrace is
now safely back inside. Amid the sound of champagne corks popping, few can make out the words of an elderly gentleman in the public gallery, one Nigel Farage, fulminating vaguely about the will of the people. Welcome back, Britain! The prodigal nation returns! What would once have seemed like a Remainer fever dream no longer feels so absurd. For the first time since the Brexit referendum of June 2016, the idea of asking to return to the fold is on Britain’s political horizon. Granted, for now the idea of Bre-entry is confined to Labour politicians, floating the notion to charm party members ahead of a possible challenge to Sir Keir Starmer; several hope to become prime minister in his stead. Granted, too, that the euro-bashers of Mr Farage’s Reform UK party are far ahead in the polls. But rejoining the EU seems to resonate with many British voters, a majority of whom think leaving was a mistake. The notion is unlikely to go away soon. As more and more Westminster politicians declare they favour applying for re-entry, the EU may one day need to say what it thinks of the idea of Britain boomeranging back into the union it left in a huff. The current state of Britain-EU relations offers nary a hint of what response might emanate from Brussels. Since the divorce was officialised in 2020, the two sides have haggled over relatively small fry, such as aligning rules on food safety and whatnot. That is the purview of mid-level Eurocrats. In contrast, a bid for Bre-entry would be taken up by the EU’s national leaders in Paris, Berlin and beyond. Plenty would see the case for Britain to rejoin. Any union should welcome a G7 country with a seat on the UN Security Council, its own nuclear weapons and the continent’s biggest capital- markets hub. The same factors that are prompting some in Britain to discuss a return—a chaotic global order, in which America and China vie for supremacy and leave middle powers scrambling for security—should also sway the EU towards Bre-entry. Across the union, voters say they would welcome Britain back. Pas si vite, some diplomats might retort. Britain was always a half-hearted member of the EU. It insisted on opt-outs from some of the bloc’s flagship measures, notably the euro and the Schengen passport-free travel area, not to mention demanding rebates on its contributions to the budget. Why bring the awkward squad back into a union they think has worked just fine without it? Since Britain’s departure, the EU has pushed forward with federalising
schemes that British prime ministers would no doubt have proudly kiboshed at Brussels summits. EU spending is now funded in part with money jointly borrowed by its 27 member states, surely a taboo in London. The union has adopted French ideas on industrial policy and “strategic autonomy”, in part thanks to not having to worry about British vetoes. In theory, Britain’s reaccession bid would be treated no differently from those of other countries, from Ukraine to Serbia, which have formally asked to join the EU. In practice it would be both easier and harder. As a past member whose regulation has not much diverged from the acquis communautaire, the hundreds of tomes of EU rules that all prospective joiners must accept, Britain would jump through hoops faster than most. The tough bit—apart from dozens of national governments each wielding a veto over the final decision—is that some might insist Britain could join the EU only if it also agreed to adopt the euro and Schengen. This could serve as a test of how seriously the aspiring newcomer really wants to be part of the club this time. In practice it would be easy enough for Britain to commit to join either one “when the right conditions were met”, only for said conditions never to be met. The budget rebate Britain once enjoyed would no doubt have to go, which might have happened anyway had it remained in the EU. The main reason for reluctance about Bre-entry on the EU side is a niggling doubt as to whether Britain can ever be counted on to stay in. To have a member leave the union once may be regarded as a misfortune; for it to happen again would look like carelessness. In practice, says Charles Grant of the Centre for European Reform, a think-tank in London, the EU would want to see broad agreement across party lines in Britain before discussing re-entry terms, so that tomorrow’s ministers did not unpick a deal reached by today’s. That might entail the Conservatives backing a return (far-fetched for now), or Mr Farage’s political fortunes waning. Even then patience would be in order. Britain’s initial bid to join the EU in 1961 succeeded only after 12 years (and despite two French vetoes). A similar timeline would imply more than a generation had passed between the 2016 vote and Bre-entry, a suitable timeframe for a nation to change its mind. The journey would be long, tortuous—and worth it. Brits would get to unpick an error that has left them poorer and more isolated. For the EU the
prize may be even greater: to establish their union as the continent’s manifest destiny, complete with chastened British officials once again haggling late into the night over fishing quotas. ■ Subscribers to The Economist can sign up to our Opinion newsletter, which brings together the best of our leaders, columns, guest essays and reader correspondence. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//europe/2026/05/21/bre-entry-may-be-the-next-drama-to- grip-the-european-union
In football, Britain has a world-beating industry Why football attendance is booming outside the Premier League The legal case hanging over Man City and the Premier League Britain’s second-biggest city goes from dysfunctional to worse Labour’s “battle for ideas” is a skirmish over small differences Hate Labour? Vote Labour!
In football, Britain has a world-beating industry Many things in the country aren’t working. The Premier League is May 21st 2026 Bus conductors in Nigeria are typically Chelsea fans. In Goma, a city under the control of a rebel group that opposes the Congolese state, lots of bootleg Newcastle United shirts are on sale (the Geordies have a striker, Yoane Wissa, who plays for the national team). Tiny villages alongside Lake Victoria in Kenya may have no electricity and barely any roads, but they do tend to have a pub—a shack with solar panels on the roof, a fridge to cool beer and a small television with some way of receiving Premier League games. The FancyFree pub in Brooklyn overflows with Arsenal fans when there is a game. On May 19th Arsenal clinched the league title. The presidents of both Kenya and Rwanda took to social media to congratulate the team. In Botswana the