Liu of Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Malaysia has more than 10,000 clan associations, with Penang a particular hotspot. They are also found in Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, among other countries. When they started in the early 19th century the associations were a kind of welfare state, employment agency and temple rolled into one. Migrants originating from the same clan, village or trade came together to socialise, pray to common deities, find housing and jobs, open schools, lend money and operate cemeteries. Some grew rich. The most influential ones in Georgetown own homes and palm-oil plantations, among other properties. Cheah Kongsi still provides welfare, giving between 250 and 2,000 ringgit ($55-450) per year to children of members and to retired people. These groups have long had tight membership rules. Cheah Kongsi is open only to those who can trace their heritage to a particular part of Fujian province, in southern China. Gallingly, many of the most powerful clan associations in Penang still refuse membership to women. But now they are getting anxious about the future. “The main thing we worry about is that no young people are joining,” says Clinton Cheah, a trustee of Cheah Kongsi. What will happen down the line, he wonders, especially now that members often only have one or two children? Migrants from China still move to Penang, often to work in its lively semiconductor industry. But they tend to join newer diaspora groups with more current ties to the Chinese mainland and less discriminatory membership requirements. Some regret the clan groups’ diminished role in integrating newcomers. What it means to be Chinese is contested: with their long histories, the clan associations offer an alternative to the version the Chinese government exports. At least one of the big clan associations in Penang is finally modernising. The Yeoh Kongsi decided to admit women only in February 2025. “It was a very sensitive decision, so the board gave its blessing only after seeking divine approval,” says Yeoh Seng Hooi, a trustee. “Should we admit women?” a member asked the gods, before throwing two crescent-shaped wooden blocks. The association has since welcomed 14 women, 35% of its new members. Thank heavens for that. ■
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Vladimir Putin’s turn with Xi Jinping How China quietly helps Russia in Ukraine What China can learn from Japan about escaping deflation
Vladimir Putin’s turn with Xi Jinping Hosting back-to-back visits by Putin and Trump, China shows its power May 21st 2026 For Xi Jinping, a leader who aspires to place China at the centre of world affairs, it was a triumphant week of diplomacy. Just four days after Donald Trump concluded a visit to Beijing, looking for business deals and help with Iran, Vladimir Putin turned up, seeking assistance for his war in Ukraine. Russia’s president, like America’s, lavished praise on his host and left with a clutch of agreements. But like Mr Trump’s, the deals were short on detail. And the enduring image at home and abroad was one of China as the fulcrum of global geopolitics, dealing with America as an equal and Russia as a junior partner. China had not originally planned for the visits to be so close: Mr Trump’s was scheduled for early April but delayed by the war in the Gulf. Still, the
timing worked well for Mr Xi. It sent a clear message that better relations between China and America will not come at the expense of his “no limits” partnership with Mr Putin. At the same time, Mr Xi showed the leverage that he has gained over Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Despite talk of shared interests, Mr Putin ended his two-day visit on May 20th without a long-discussed deal on the building of another gas pipeline between Russia and China. Mr Putin’s visit was not as elaborate as Mr Trump’s. China greeted the Kremlin’s leader in the same way, with a military honour guard, a 21-gun salute and cheering children. Mr Xi and Mr Putin then held formal talks, followed by another meeting over tea, in the Great Hall of the People. But there was no equivalent of Mr Trump’s private tours of the Temple of Heaven and Zhongnanhai, the leadership compound. And Mr Putin and Mr Xi did not attempt any of the more personal displays of camaraderie that they have staged before, such as swigging vodka, making pancakes or watching a hockey game. Instead they emphasised the breadth of their relationship and their shared opposition to many aspects of American policy. In a lengthy joint statement, they condemned American and Israeli attacks on Iran, as well as the abduction of heads of state (a clear reference to Venezuela’s). They expressed opposition to sanctions on North Korea and to external interference in Latin America and the Caribbean. They criticised Mr Trump’s “Golden Dome” missile-defence project as well as America’s “irresponsible” nuclear policy. And they renewed calls for a multipolar world order, warning of a drift towards the “law of the jungle”. As Mr Xi put it, in a thinly veiled reference to America: “The tide of unilateral hegemony is running rampant.” In his public remarks, China’s leader put particular emphasis on the Middle East. He called for a “complete cessation of hostilities” there, warning that it would be “unacceptable” to resume fighting. That was sharper language than he used during Mr Trump’s visit. The Trump administration has been considering the possibility of resuming strikes on Iran, which have been suspended since a ceasefire was announced in mid-April.
Russian officials emphasised the 40 or so agreements that were signed during the summit, covering areas ranging from artificial intelligence and border infrastructure to co-operation in space and the protection of tigers and leopards. Mr Putin highlighted energy ties, noting that Russia was one of China’s biggest suppliers of oil and gas and that nearly all their trade was done in roubles or yuan, protecting it from “external influence” (that is, American sanctions). He invited Mr Xi, whom he called a “dear friend”, to visit Russia in 2027. Yet there were few details of how the agreements would be implemented. And there was no mention in them, or in the two leaders’ public remarks, of Power of Siberia 2—a 1,600-mile (2,600-km) pipeline that would carry up to 50bn cubic metres of gas annually from eastern Russia to northern China via Mongolia. Russia is keen to make progress on the project to secure a new market for gas it can no longer sell to Europe. But China has been driving a hard bargain on price, volumes and other terms. It has also been reluctant to rely on any single supplier for more than about 20% of its hydrocarbon imports, a level it has already reached with Russia. Russian officials had hoped that China would show more flexibility since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz highlighted the vulnerability of its seaborne imports of energy. About 90% of China’s oil imports still come by sea, largely from the Middle East, despite its efforts to diversify supplies and build pipelines across its borders. China and Russia seemed to make progress on the project when Mr Putin visited Beijing in September. Alexey Miller, the boss of Russia’s state-run gas company, Gazprom, announced afterwards that they had signed a legally binding memorandum. China also committed to “advancing preliminary work” on the project in its latest five- year plan, unveiled in March. In the end, though, Mr Xi appears to have stood firm on his demands for better terms. That underlined how Russia, once China’s patron, has become dependent on Chinese economic support as well as dual-use technology for the war in Ukraine. “It’s a pretty solid display of how much leverage China has,” says Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre, a think-tank in Berlin. “Putin comes out not really empty-handed— everything that’s working is working—but there is no additional mileage that China is willing to go to support him, unless it’s really very beneficial
for the Chinese.” Mr Gabuev also said that the back-to-back summits played well for Mr Xi by suggesting that he has better relations with both Mr Putin and Mr Trump than they have with each other. Other deals between China and Russia may not have been made public. One of Mr Putin’s priorities was likely to have been securing access to more dual-use items, including drone components. Mr Xi, meanwhile, had been expected to seek more Russian help in developing China’s military capabilities, especially in undersea warfare, and in accessing data and tactical insights from the front lines in Ukraine. The two leaders’ statement did not mention such matters, saying only that the two countries would deepen defence co-operation, expand joint military exercises and patrols, and “work together to address various risks and challenges”. Further details may emerge in the days following the summit, just as they have trickled out since Mr Trump left Beijing. For the moment, however, Mr Xi must be celebrating a diplomatic double-bill that brought him closer than ever to the Sino-centric world he craves. ■ Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//china/2026/05/18/vladimir-putins-turn-with-xi-jinping
How China quietly helps Russia in Ukraine Its firms send drones, nitrocellulose for rockets and more May 21st 2026 RUSSIA’S DEPENDENCE on China to sustain its war against Ukraine has steadily increased as Western sanctions have intensified. China maintains that it is neutral in the conflict, denying it gives Russia lethal aid such as finished weapons systems. But by supplying huge volumes of “dual-use” components and materials, it provides vital support for Russia’s military- industrial base. During his state visit to Beijing on May 19th and 20th, Vladimir Putin was a supplicant. Chinese microelectronics and semiconductors are critical to Russia’s ability to churn out the precision-guided missiles and drones that pound Ukrainian cities. China also supplies most of the commercial first-person-view (FPV) drones and supporting technologies Russia needs. China also provides