months. After taking office last October, Ms Takaichi told parliament that Japan might have a role to play in a conflict over Taiwan, triggering an apoplectic response from China. Relations have deteriorated since; it has become clear that normalising ties will be harder than during past feuds. Backchannels that once helped ease the relationship are bunged up. And growing warmth between America and China bodes ill for chances of a rapprochement. The last major falling-out between Japan and China followed clashes over the uninhabited and disputed Senkaku islands in 2010-12. The focus of the current dispute is Taiwan, which Mr Xi defines as the “core of China’s core interests”. Ms Takaichi positions herself as a staunch friend of Taiwan, to China’s chagrin. Japan also sees Taiwan’s fate as deeply intertwined with its own: hence Ms Takaichi acknowledged a conflict over it would probably constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. China has sought to make Ms Takaichi a “symbol” of what happens to those who cross its red lines on Taiwan, says Kawashima Shin of the University of Tokyo. The maritime front line has become more tense in recent months. In December Chinese fighter jets locked their radars onto Japanese aircraft. A Japanese destroyer went through the Taiwan Strait in April, for the first time since Ms Takaichi became prime minister; China took extra umbrage at the fact it took place on the anniversary of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the Sino-Japanese war in 1895 and handed control of Taiwan from China to Japan. The following week two Chinese naval vessels passed closer to Japan’s mainland than normal and China began building a new structure in the East China Sea, where the two have overlapping maritime claims. Japan has been beefing up its defences in its south-western islands. That is part of a long-term build-up to counter China. This spring Japan’s self- defence forces (SDF) deployed long-range missiles to a base in Kyushu, a southern island, which has put the Chinese mainland in range. Ms Takaichi recently loosened restrictions on exports of Japanese weaponry. China has denounced the moves, lambasting a “new Japanese militarism”. While such rhetoric may be inflamed, it betrays a genuine concern about the long-term trend of Japan becoming a more proactive player in the region’s security.
People-to-people ties have also become strained. The number of Chinese visitors to Japan fell by more than half in the first quarter of this year, compared with a year earlier. Japanese pop stars have had concerts cancelled in China. Bombastic anti-Japanese videos have become a popular genre on Chinese social media: one viral clip features a Chinese archer shooting bows into the head of a mannequin that has been plastered with the Japanese flag. Offline, several disturbing, albeit isolated, incidents have occurred. In March a knife-wielding SDF officer broke into the Chinese embassy in Tokyo; on May 19th a Chinese man stabbed three people, two of them Japanese, at a restaurant in Shanghai. Most worrying for Japan are Chinese curbs on rare-earth exports. Measures announced in January and February targeted dual-use items and Japanese firms involved in the defence industry. Though Japan diversified its rare earth supplies somewhat after previous run-ins with China, a prolonged cut- off would still pose serious problems. Publicly available data suggest that China has been choking off supplies of specific heavy-earth elements. But in contrast to the Senkaku crisis, there have not so far been large-scale boycotts of Japanese consumer product, perhaps because “this time the Chinese government is worried about the state of the Chinese economy,” reckons Seguchi Kiyoyuki of the Canon Institute for Global Studies, a think-tank in Tokyo. Nonetheless, a sense of confrontation has become entrenched. In the past Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) could turn to high-ranking lawmakers that the Chinese Communist Party considered trusted intermediaries. When Abe Shinzo, a long-serving prime minister, wanted to begin a rapprochement with China in 2015, he reached out to one such figure, Nikai Toshihiro, who led a delegation of 3,000 executives to Beijing and hand-delivered a letter to Mr Xi. But Mr Nikai, like many of his peers, has since retired. This year a delegation of Japanese executives got the cold shoulder from Chinese officials and cancelled their annual trip for the first time in more than 13 years. Younger politicians see little upside in cultivating ties with Chinese counterparts, given that more than 80% of Japanese voters have negative views of China. The China-friendly politicians who remain active are far from Ms Takaichi’s inner circle. Komeito, a political party associated with
Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist movement, was once an important conduit between Japan and China. Ikeda Daisaku, the movement’s founder, publicly advocated normalising Sino-Japanese relations following the second world war. When Komeito was part of a ruling coalition with the LDP, its leaders helped pass messages to Beijing. But Komeito left the coalition following Ms Takaichi’s rise. Mr Trump’s overtures to Mr Xi will only make a rapprochement harder. Relations between Japan and China tend to move in concert with those between America and China, and between America and Japan. When China’s relationship with America is tense, it seeks warmer ties with Japan; when America and Japan drift apart, China seeks to drive a wedge between them. “China now has less reason to fix the relationship with Japan,” says Sahashi Ryo of the University of Tokyo: “The triangle really matters.” ■ For exclusive coverage of Asian politics, economics and security, sign up to Asia Bulletin, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//asia/2026/05/21/why-japan-and-china-will-struggle-to- end-their-feud
Is Donald Trump selling out Taiwan? He suggests he is bargaining with China over weapons sales to the island May 21st 2026 For a moment, it seemed that Taiwan had dodged a bullet. Throughout the formalities of Donald Trump’s two-day visit to Beijing, which ended on May 15th, the American president avoided talking publicly about Taiwan. That temporarily soothed Taiwanese fears that he might bow to Chinese pressure to curb arms sales to the island, or even change America’s public position towards it by saying that he “opposed” its independence. Then things started to unravel. In an interview with Fox News recorded just before he left Beijing, and speaking to reporters on Air Force One after take- off, Mr Trump made a series of comments about Taiwan that deeply unnerved many on the island. He suggested that America’s 44-year commitment not to negotiate with China over arms sales to Taiwan was out
of date. He also said he had discussed a $13bn arms package for Taiwan “in great detail” with Xi Jinping, China’s leader, and saw it as a useful bargaining chip. And he portrayed Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, as trying to achieve independence and drag America into a war. At the same time, Mr Trump surprised many listeners by suggesting that he would talk to “the person who’s running Taiwan” about the arms package. There has been no direct contact between sitting American and Taiwanese leaders since 1979, although Taiwan’s previous president, Tsai Ing-wen, called Mr Trump (when he was president-elect) to congratulate him on his election victory in 2016. Muddling the picture further, Mr Trump repeated his allegation that Taiwan “stole” America’s semiconductor industry and said it should shift all of its chip manufacturing to American soil. He has said such things before, but rarely since Taiwan promised to invest $250bn in America as part of a trade deal sealed in February. Mr Trump insisted American policy had not changed. But his remarks suggested that Mr Xi had made some progress in swaying his thinking about Taiwan. Early on the first day of the meeting in Beijing, Mr Xi warned that mishandling the Taiwan issue could spark a conflict between China and America. The Chinese leader then spent most of that evening talking about the island, according to Mr Trump. “I heard him out,” he added. Mr Trump’s comments also suggested that he is taking a more transactional view of American relations with Taiwan than his predecessors, and is less committed to its defence. Taiwan’s immediate concern is the new arms package. Mr Trump approved a record $11bn one in December. Ahead of the summit, it emerged that he had delayed a second one, worth about $13bn, which has been approved by Congress. America has delayed arms packages ahead of meetings with Chinese leaders before. But Taiwanese officials will be deeply concerned if the new one is postponed for more than a few weeks after the summit. “I may do it. I may not do it,” Mr Trump told Fox. “I’m holding that in abeyance, and it depends on China. It depends. It’s a very good negotiating chip for us, frankly.” America has previously maintained that arms sales to Taiwan should not be included in broader negotiations with China, partly because America has
been obliged under its own law since 1979 to help the island defend itself. President Ronald Reagan also promised in 1982 not to negotiate with China over arms sales to Taiwan. Asked about that, Mr Trump told reporters: “Well, I think the 1980s is a long way.” That was especially disappointing for Taiwan’s government as, after months of wrangling with opposition parties, it has just managed to push through parliament a supplementary defence budget of about $25bn to fund both American arms packages. Taiwan’s biggest opposition party, the Kuomintang, or kmt, will no doubt point to Mr Trump’s comments as further evidence that the island can no longer rely on American support and needs to pursue closer ties with the mainland. The kmt hopes that that message will help it in local elections in November and in a presidential poll in 2028. Equally troubling for Taiwan’s government was Mr Trump’s suggestion that providing arms to Taiwan might encourage Mr Lai to declare independence. “They have somebody there now that wants to go independent,” he said. “If you kept it the way it is, I think China is going to be okay with that. But we’re not looking to have somebody say ‘Let’s go independent because the United States is backing us’.” In response, Mr Lai reiterated his position that Taiwan is already, de facto, a sovereign independent nation. The island would “never be sacrificed or traded away”, he said. The question now is whether Mr Trump agrees with him. ■ For exclusive coverage of Asian politics, economics and security, sign up to Asia Bulletin, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//asia/2026/05/18/is-donald-trump-selling-out-taiwan