The moral for some who look at the miserable polling of Messrs Macron, Merz and Starmer—all decent men—is that European social democracies have become ungovernable. Caught between low growth, high taxes and borrowing and the demand for more public spending, exhausted centrists seem incapable of bringing about change or seeing off the populist challenge from the right and the left. Nowhere more so than in post-Brexit Britain, which, with five heads of government in six years, has got through prime ministers almost as fast as Chelsea has replaced its managers. Larry, Number 10’s chief mouser, has become a furry beacon of stability. Yet Britain is not ungovernable. Sir Keir blames his problems on everybody else, but they should really be put down to that unfashionable quality in politics: “character”. The counsel of despair which says Britain should cling to a lame duck for fear of something worse is a formula for the populist insurgency safety-minded centrists most want to avoid. It is true that the prime minister has had a lot on his plate. Real wages in Britain have barely grown over 20 years. The departure from the European Union and its $18trn single market has lowered Britain’s GDP per person by between 4% and 8%, some studies say. Governments terrified of angering NIMBYs have failed to deal with a chronic lack of productivity growth. Between 2008 and 2023 output per hour worked increased by 21% for American workers. In Britain it grew by a miserly 7%. Battered by Brexit, Liz Truss’s premiership and soaring energy prices, Britain’s government bonds have the highest yields in the G7. Politics has compounded Sir Keir’s problems. Perversely, Labour’s huge, 165-seat parliamentary majority has turned out to be a source of instability. As we have argued, when several parties have similar levels of support in a first-past-the-post electoral system, small changes in the share of votes lead to wild swings in the number of seats parties can expect to win. As Labour’s popularity has ebbed, many of its fainthearted MPs are tempted to rebel by the prospect of losing their jobs. However, as that all-conquering parliamentary majority also attests, Sir Keir had a chance to make a better fist of governing. Britain’s institutions still function. Relations with Europe, for so long a drag on the economy, are now
an opportunity for growth. So too, as Labour rightly spotted, are cutting red tape in planning and curbing unsustainable welfare. Other countries, such as Australia, Canada and Norway, have faced headwinds and yet centrist parties there have survived and even thrived. A large part of the reason Britain has not joined them is Sir Keir himself. Even before he took power, he pinned his government down with manifesto commitments not to raise income taxes or VAT. His half-baked reforms were painful enough to alarm voters but too small to have a meaningful effect on the economy. The big stuff never materialised: no big tax reset, no brave welfare reform, no ambitious rapprochement with the EU. He talked about speeding up planning, but wavered as soon as he hit resistance. Prime ministers need authority and clarity. Sir Keir, it turns out, has neither. He cannot articulate a vision. Nor is he grounded in one. Twenty-first century policymaking is so complicated that voters want to be able to trust that the prime minister has the instincts to appoint the right people, weigh the evidence and make sensible decisions. Yet voters have sniffed out what Sir Keir is made of. A YouGov poll since this month’s elections finds that only 29% of them want him to stay in office. Panicky Labour MPs have become a rabble. Jettisoning a prime minister carries risks. As the Conservatives showed, it is habit-forming. Labour could tack to the left, causing a panic in bond markets. If it learns the wrong lessons, a change in personnel alone could set Britain on an even worse path. And yet the risks of Sir Keir staying on are greater—as the country could find if he sees off his challengers until the next crisis or the one after that. As a prime minister surviving against the will of many of his MPs, he too would be dragged left. In any case, whoever is prime minister, the scope for foolish left-wing policies will be limited by the bond markets, which have British borrowing on a tight leash. Labour leaders understand their party and the country need growth. A more important attribute today is the political skill to set that as a direction for the country and defend it. The promise of a leadership contest is that it will draw out the candidates who best meet that test.
Two paths now lie ahead: a chance of renewal or downward spiralling. Whoever takes over from Sir Keir will inherit an enviable majority, three more years in office and a loyal cat. The country’s problems are fixable. British assets are cheap. Voters want change. True, Labour could succumb to more infighting, but this could also be the rock-bottom moment. The alternative is dark. This weekend, a large crowd is expected in London’s streets for Tommy Robinson, an agitator who talks of resisting an “Islamic invasion”. Britain’s deserved reputation as a tolerant, multicultural success story is showing cracks. Episodes of bigotry are growing, from antisemitism in the name of “Free Palestine” to Muslim-bashing in the name of “save British values”. If the centre does not hold, the snake-oil sellers will win the next general election. That might really make Britain ungovernable. ■ For subscribers only: to see how we design each week’s cover, sign up to our weekly Cover Story newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//leaders/2026/05/14/sir-keir-starmer-has-failed-abjectly- he-should-go
Oil prices could soon rise convulsively The present tranquility will not last May 14th 2026 THE LARGEST supply shock in petroleum history is getting larger fast. Some 2bn barrels, or 5% of the world’s yearly oil supply, have already been lost because the Strait of Hormuz is shut. Every day it remains closed the deficit grows by 14m barrels. Since peace talks between America and Iran have stalled, a reopening still seems many days away. Yet oil markets look strangely calm. Brent crude futures, at $105 a barrel, have fallen from April highs of nearly $120. They remain below the peak of $129 in 2022, after Russia invaded Ukraine. Spot prices have slid even more, implying that crude oil is more plentiful than it was earlier in the war. The surprising mini-glut is real—but do not take too much comfort from it. A full-blown energy disaster may be weeks away.
Two unlikely saviours are shielding the world from catastrophe. One is America. Its exports of crude and refined products, net of imports, have surged to 9m barrels per day (b/d)—nearly 4m b/d above the level at the same time last year. That reflects the agility of America’s energy firms, which have harnessed their stocks, refineries and terminals to serve more high-paying customers abroad. It also confirms the usefulness of America’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which the government began tapping in March. These extra barrels allowed shipments abroad to rise without crimping domestic supply. The second accidental hero is China, which is importing 4.5m b/d less crude than a year ago. This reflects weaker consumer demand for dearer fuel. It also follows from the government’s decisions. Early in the war it banned refiners from exporting products and authorised them to draw on stocks. This reduced refineries’ demand for foreign oil. This, plus demand-destroying rationing in poor countries, explains the placidity of crude markets. Yet if Hormuz stays closed, a storm will come— and then governments must avoid policies that make it more destructive. The world entered the war with oil stocks close to ten-year highs. As importers draw on reserves to offset lost Gulf supply, those could become
emptier than ever by June. A buffer of near-record volumes of oil at sea— made available, in part, by higher Gulf exports before the war—has now largely been exhausted. Even American and Chinese national reserves will not last for ever, let alone the thin stocks of poor countries. Soon, therefore, private stocks in the rich world will start being bled. Prices could then rise convulsively—reflecting both the low absolute level of inventories and their geographically uneven distribution. Refined products will be hit first. Trapped Gulf exports and cuts to refinery output elsewhere have already drained diesel, petrol and jet-fuel reserves, driving prices up far faster than crude’s. As stocks vanish, prices will have to rise still more to balance demand and supply. The shock will intensify if China starts buying more crude. With nearly 1.2bn barrels in reserve it may, in theory, shun expensive imports for months. But it will also want to preserve a buffer, so it may return to the market. The other risk is that Donald Trump loses his nerve. He and other America First populists will bridle at exports that soar while domestic stocks dwindle —especially if this pushes petrol above $5 a gallon. In 2022 such price rises hurt both drivers’ pockets and Joe Biden’s approval ratings as president. Mr Trump’s administration is already debating a possible export ban. Were it to enforce one, global prices would rise fast. America’s coasts, which rely on imports, would be hurt by higher import prices and any retaliation from other exporters. Its refiners, seeing margins crushed, would cut output. The world economy has found some calm in the eye of the energy storm. But it is far from harbour. A reckless decision by America could all too easily capsize it. ■ Subscribers to The Economist can sign up to our Opinion newsletter, which brings together the best of our leaders, columns, guest essays and reader correspondence. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//leaders/2026/05/14/oil-prices-could-soon-rise- convulsively
Indonesia, the biggest Muslim-majority country, is on a risky path Prabowo Subianto is eroding its finances—and its democracy May 14th 2026 Indonesia’s president, Prabowo Subianto, has seen his country explode before. It was in 1998, during the Asian financial crisis. Then, an economic collapse led to mass protests and the toppling of Mr Prabowo’s father-in-law, Suharto, a notoriously corrupt dictator. It also cast Mr Prabowo, who had hoped to succeed Suharto, into the political wilderness. It took him a quarter of a century to claw his way back, finally winning the top job in 2024. So you might think he would be extremely wary of another fiscal crisis. You would be wrong. The leader of the world’s biggest Muslim-majority country has centralised power and surrounded himself with a flock of flatterers. He dumped a