on social-media platforms: a “funhouse mirror” of public opinion, reflecting real attitudes in exaggerated, contorted form. In a recent paper Dr Brown and Ed Harrison show how Reform, which dismissed mass deportations as a “political impossibility” in 2024, shifted its position within a year. An argument first made by far-right accounts travelled through adjacent networks and into the accounts of more moderate conservative influencers. X functioned as an engine for pushing the Overton window of acceptable policy. Mr Robinson’s influence is greatest when his audience is already primed for outrage. After an attacker stabbed and killed girls at a Taylor Swift-themed dance class in Southport, Mr Robinson tweeted incessantly from Cyprus —“Stoking Race Riots from his Sunbed”, as a Daily Mail front page put it. While Mr Farage mostly kept quiet, in one weekend 268 posts from Mr Robinson racked up 160m views. On Telegram, another social-media app, he posted messages like: “What will it take for you to be angry enough to do something about this?” Though he denies inciting the riots, and says he called for them to stop, protesters marched through the streets singing his name. There are limits to Mr Robinson’s reach. The MAGA media ecosystem which nourishes him is fracturing. And though Mr Farage and Mr Robinson need one another—the former to make his views look moderate, the latter to mainstream his—there are signs that Mr Robinson’s indirect influence over Reform harms it. He has a positive approval rating with people who voted Reform in 2024 but a negative one with new voters, who have put the party top of the polls. He remains electoral poison. Mr Robinson knows this. Instead of standing for office, he speaks of using “culture and identity” to draw the disillusioned into politics. On May 16th organisers hope for more families than hooligans: “No masks, no excessive alcohol, be peaceful and respectful,” warns a flyer. He hopes that politicians will pick up his ideas. When Mr Farage talks of “two-tier policing”, the notion that white Britons are policed more harshly than minorities, he is echoing language first used by Mr Robinson’s relative and EDL co-founder Kevin Carroll. When Robert Jenrick, a Tory who has since defected to Reform, filmed a foray into a migrant camp in France, his could have been
one of Mr Robinson’s old clips. Last May, a centre-left prime minister spoke of an “island of strangers”. Mr Robinson’s world is closer than you think.■ For more expert analysis of the biggest stories in Britain, sign up to Blighty, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//britain/2026/05/14/how-tommy-robinson-far-right- influencer-shaped-views-on-britain
Anatomy of a coup against Keir Labour’s lefty members could soon be the most important voters in the country May 14th 2026 The Labour Party rule book is required reading for political journalists. At times of turmoil, the PDF racks up thousands of clicks. As nearly 100 of Sir Keir Starmer’s MPs turn against him, the manual is being pored over again. The document explains that any potential challenger to Sir Keir needs to secure the nominations of 81 MPs (one-fifth of the parliamentary party) to trigger a leadership election. If the prime minister chose to fight, he would automatically be nominated. If he resigns, potential candidates would additionally require the backing of 5% of local Labour Party branches or three affiliated organisations (including two trade unions). If only one
candidate is nominated, they would become leader by default, like Gordon Brown in 2007. The nomination process makes it impossible for the hard-left, Corbynite wing of the party to field a candidate. The Socialist Campaign Group, which represents it in Parliament, has just 24 MPs. Instead, leadership candidates would probably come from the party’s soft left (including figures such as Angela Rayner and Ed Miliband), centre-left (Yvette Cooper, John Healey) or centrist factions (Wes Streeting, Pat McFadden). The process makes it hard for more than three candidates to get on the ballot. If an election is triggered, Labour members—fewer than 250,000 of them— would be able to pick the next prime minister. Recent leadership contests have taken months but none has taken place while Labour is in government. So who are those Labour members? Polling published after the general election of 2024 suggests they are disproportionately male (57%), old (72% over the age of 50) and middle-class (72%). They are eye-wateringly left- wing (though the left-most members may have departed). Almost nine in ten say taxes and public spending should be increased, compared with six in ten Labour voters. They tend to be pro-immigration. The peculiarities of the group mean polls should be taken with a pinch of salt. Those that exist suggest members most favour Andy Burnham, the mayor of Greater Manchester. But he is not an MP. A different section of the rule book deals with the procedural rigmarole he would need to navigate to become one. Whoever the candidates are, Labour’s rules could put the final decision in the hands of an unrepresentative body of left-wing anoraks. The public would—fairly—feel they deserve a say. Though none is required, the demand for a general election could become intense. ■ For more expert analysis of the biggest stories in Britain, sign up to Blighty, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//britain/2026/05/14/anatomy-of-a-coup-against-keir
Bond-market lessons for Labour’s leadership hopefuls The gilt market cannot be tamed, only respected May 14th 2026 Labour’s drubbing in the local elections on May 7th has started two crucial contests. The first, to replace Sir Keir Starmer as prime minister, is already getting messy. The second, between leadership hopefuls and the bond market, could get ugly. Andy Burnham, one would-be prime minister, has moaned about Britain being “in hock to the bond markets”. One MP supporting Mr Burnham said the bond markets would “have to fall in line” if he were elected. Investors in gilts (British government bonds) have hit back. For ten-year gilts the yield (the rate the government pays to borrow) rose by nearly 0.2 percentage points on May 11th-12th alone.
Many Labour politicians see the gilt market as a bully that will back down if you stand up to it. In reality, the government spends more than it taxes and must persuade investors to fund the gap. Those investors ask two questions: how risky is British government debt? And, adjusting for that risk, can they get a better return elsewhere? The answers are largely determined by global forces or structural problems with the British economy that cannot be magicked away. No leadership hopeful can fully shake off the gilt market’s whims. But fiscal incontinence makes matters worse; avoiding it is the best way to escape the market’s wrath. Since the Iran war began yields on ten-year gilts have leapt from 4.2% to a high of 5.2% in late April. This trajectory is a global phenomenon; sharply rising energy prices are increasing inflation everywhere. Markets expect central banks will need to raise interest rates to bring price rises back to target. But Britain is unusual in how badly it has been damaged. The country’s yields, already the highest in the G7 group of large rich countries, have seen the biggest jump since the Iran war began—double that of Germany (see chart 1). Britain’s expensive debt is partly caused by exposure to inflation and high energy costs. In the years before the Iran conflict high prices had proved stickier in Britain than elsewhere. As late as February annual inflation was
3% (against 1.9% in the euro zone). Combine this with Britain’s over- reliance on gas imports, and investors have been persuaded that Britain faces a uniquely virulent bout of inflation. Then there is the term premium, the extra compensation that investors demand for holding longer-dated debt. Analysis by Goldman Sachs, a bank, suggests that the ten-year term premium in Britain has risen by over two percentage points since 2022, compared with around one point for the European Union over the same period (see chart 2). Poor fiscal choices by consecutive governments contributed to this. Under the Tories, Liz Truss’s unfunded tax cuts in 2022 gave bond traders the jitters; so did Labour’s promises at the last general election not to raise taxes on “working people”. Even today the government’s plan to get the deficit down to 2% of GDP by 2029-30 relies on future tax rises that few expect it to enact. Still, Britain’s higher-term premium cannot be explained by government profligacy alone: France and America both have worse government deficits and debt levels, yet can borrow at cheaper rates. An alternative explanation rests on the changing structure of the gilt market. Sturdy domestic pension funds, once the bedrock of gilt demand, have bought fewer bonds in recent years. Their place has been taken by overseas