Rubbing in the insult Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, issued a decree to “permit” the parade to proceed, saying that Red Square would not be attacked. This came shortly after Ukraine and Russia agreed to a three- day ceasefire brokered by America, though by May 10th both sides were accusing the other of having violated it. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, speaking after the parade, said he thought the war was “coming to an end”. The symbolism of the diminished parade is hard to overstate. A day that was meant to epitomise the military might of Mr Putin’s Russia instead signalled its vulnerability and weakness. In this, at least, it was an accurate reflection of Russia’s battlefield setbacks, and of Russia’s fear of the growing effectiveness of Ukraine’s long-range strikes. For the first time in nearly three years the initiative in the war appears to have shifted in favour of Ukraine. Having got through a harsh winter, when its cities and energy grid were pummelled almost nightly by massed Russian drones and missiles, Ukraine is now turning the tide. It is imposing increasing costs on Russia by almost every measure. Not only has Russia’s expected spring offensive been a flop, but in April Russian forces suffered a net loss of territory for the first time since August 2024 (when Ukraine seized territory in Russia’s Kursk oblast). The Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a think-tank in Washington, recently listed contributing factors to Ukraine’s successes: ground counter-attacks and mid- range strikes by Ukraine’s forces; the end of Russia’s illicit use of Starlink terminals in Ukraine; and the Kremlin’s paranoid throttling of the Telegram messaging app at home. By our calculations, based on ISW maps, Russia has lost control of 113 square kilometres over the past 30 days.
“Overall, it feels like an inflection point in the war,” says Sir Lawrence Freedman, an emeritus professor of war studies at King’s College London. “If the Russians have nothing to show for their efforts I would not be surprised if in some places things start crumbling.” Losses of soldiers, running at 35,000 a month, exceed the pace at which Russia can recruit replacements. And behind the raw numbers—nearly 1.4m killed and seriously wounded since Russia’s invasion—is a grimmer new development. Until last year, the ratio of killed to wounded Russian soldiers may have been between 1:2 and 1:3, poor by modern standards but roughly in line with past conflicts. In March Mr Zelensky said that Russia was suffering almost two dead soldiers for every one wounded. “The stoicism and fatalism of Russian soldiers must be wearing thin,” says Sir Lawrence. The dead-to-wounded ratio appears to be rising because so many casualties —perhaps as many as 80%—are now caused by so-called first-person view (FPV) drones. Loaded with explosives, these drones hunt enemy soldiers and imperil attempts at medical evacuation, which in any case has never been a high priority for the Russians. “They simply leave their wounded on the battlefield,” says Seth Jones, a senior military analyst at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
Russian soldiers complain that Ukraine’s new autonomous drones are inaudible until they dive. They use artificial intelligence and are controlled with fibre-optic cables to thwart jammers. Alexy Chadayev, the director of a drone-development and testing facility in the Russian city of Veliky Novgorod, wrote on April 7th that Russia had “lost leadership” over the past six months to Ukraine and was struggling to move units close to the front. “We have enormous problems with last-mile logistics,” he said. “Up to 90% of our [drone-team] losses are currently occurring there.” Russia has been forced to impose restrictions on the size of convoys in Donetsk to make them harder to detect. Only two lorries are allowed to move together. A drone “kill zone” of some 20km between the front lines is being extended far to the Russian rear, Sir Lawrence argues. This has a greater impact on Russian operations than Ukrainian ones because the Russians are trying to advance. For Ukraine it is far more effective to take out the supporting infrastructure for an offensive than it is to kill the few troops who now lead attacks. The Ukrainians face similar problems in the drone-saturated killing zone, but they place a much higher value on the lives of their soldiers, and so make greater use of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for evacuation and carrying supplies close to the front. And in most places they are not trying to advance. Farther back from the front line, Russia is suffering mounting losses to Ukraine’s mid-range drones (with ranges of 50km to 300km). Mr Zelensky recently claimed that procurement of such systems so far this year is five times greater than in all of 2025. Targets include ammunition depots, drone warehouses, command-and-control posts, surface-to-air-missile launchers, radars and deployment points where armoured vehicles and troops are concentrated. Added to the battlefield setbacks is the increase in the scale, range and intensity of Ukraine’s deep-strike operations in Russia. In March, for the first time, Ukraine surpassed Russia in the number of long-range drone attacks it launched. Economic and military targets almost 2,000km from the Ukrainian border are regularly being hit. That brings 70% of Russia’s
population within range of Ukrainian drones. “The attacks have caused psychological damage to Russia,” says Mr Jones. On April 25th four of Russia’s best combat aircraft were damaged in a strike on Shagol airfield deep in the southern Urals. An oil refinery and pumping station at Perm, in the Urals, was set ablaze in early May. Oil infrastructure across multiple regions and oil-export hubs are being hit with increasing frequency. In April attacks on ports and refineries forced Russia to cut production by as much as 400,000 barrels a day, Reuters reports. On April 29th Mr Zelensky claimed that internal Russian reports indicated that the ports of Novorossiysk and Ust-Luga were operating at respectively 38% and 43% below capacity. However, overall Russian oil exports only fell by 7% in April and its revenues nearly doubled thanks to the Iran war. Russia’s size and the systematic year-long Ukrainian campaign to degrade its air-defence systems makes protecting even valuable assets almost impossible. “They can’t defend against drone attacks with area defence,” says Mr Jones. “And they don’t have point defence at many of the locations where they need it.” Whereas Ukraine has developed several types of interceptor-drones that are now shooting down about 95% of Russia’s Shahed-type attack drones, Russia has been slow to produce its own versions. The crucial question is whether Russia’s various setbacks—on the battlefield or through the destruction of economic infrastructure—are indicators that Mr Putin’s opportunities in Ukraine are shrinking. Sir Lawrence says much depends on the next few months, and in particular on whether Russia can counter Ukraine’s advances in drones. Another concern is whether Russia is husbanding its forces for a big offensive in the summer. “The reality is that they are struggling at the front and not much is going right for them,” he says. Mr Jones agrees: “It’s hard to see how things can improve for Russia. If you’re briefing Putin, it’s a pretty bleak picture.” ■ To stay on top of the biggest European stories, sign up to Café Europa, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//europe/2026/05/10/russia-is-stumbling-on-the-battlefield
Peter Magyar takes office pledging to clean up Hungary’s mess EU funds blocked because of corruption under Viktor Orban are his priority May 14th 2026 MAY 9th WAS a day of symbolism in Budapest. In the morning Peter Magyar was sworn in as prime minister in Hungary’s majestic neo-gothic parliament. For his inauguration he had picked “Europe Day”, which the European Union celebrates as its notional anniversary, to mark Hungary’s renewed commitment to the bloc. Members of parliament sang along to four anthems: the Hungarian one; the Szekely anthem of the Hungarian minority in Romania; “Ode to Joy”, the anthem of the EU; and the unofficial anthem of the Roma, performed by children in white shirts and bow ties. In the afternoon tens of thousands gathered for a “Regime Change” party on Kossuth Square.
Mr Magyar thanked the crowd for delivering a Hungary “that is democratic once again”, and promised a “system change” after 16 years of Viktor Orban’s illiberal rule. It is a hugely ambitious project. Mr Magyar must re- establish the rule of law, hold Mr Orban and his corrupt cronies accountable for their deeds and, perhaps most important, repair Hungary’s relationship with the EU. Rebuilding ties with Brussels is particularly urgent. Because of Mr Orban’s violations of the rule of law, the EU has blocked the disbursal of funds amounting to around €18bn ($21bn), nearly 10% of Hungary’s GDP. The biggest pot of aid is from the union’s post-covid recovery plan, which will expire at the end of August. “Magyar is prioritising the two conditions for the receipt of those funds, putting in place an anti-corruption programme and a plan to restore judicial independence,” says Kim Lane Scheppele, an expert on Hungarian law at Princeton University. Mr Magyar made a start by announcing that Hungary will create a programme to recover misappropriated assets, and will join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which prosecutes crimes involving the EU’s budget. Judicial independence can be achieved by simply enforcing the laws that Mr Orban refused to, says Ms Lane Scheppele. For example, the Supreme Court must allocate cases randomly; under Mr Orban, cases involving the government were assigned to friendly judges. Mr Orban liked to concentrate power in a few big ministries. Mr Magyar’s cabinet, by contrast, has grown to 16 ministers, mainly experienced outsiders who have not served in government. Anita Orban (no relation of Viktor), a diplomat and energy expert, is the foreign minister. The economy minister is Istvan Kapitany, a former executive at Shell. Romulusz Ruszin- Szendi, the armed forces’ chief of staff until Mr Orban ousted him for his pro-Western views, takes over as defence minister. Perhaps the most popular choice is Zsolt Hegedus, the health minister, whose dance moves amused crowds on election day and at the inauguration party. But Mr Magyar made his first big misstep by announcing he would nominate Marton Mellethei-Barna, his brother-in-law, as justice minister. He may have felt he needed a loyal lieutenant in the post. The move drew accusations of nepotism, and Mr Mellethei-Barna withdrew his candidacy.
After Mr Orban’s cronyistic rule, Hungarians have had enough of family connections. ■ To stay on top of the biggest European stories, sign up to Café Europa, our weekly subscriber-only newsletter. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//europe/2026/05/14/peter-magyar-takes-office-pledging-to- clean-up-hungarys-mess