likely, America became entangled in a long conflict of questionable geostrategic value in far-off South-East Asia. And so it would be. As more and more ground forces arrived in South Vietnam, North Vietnam answered with further deployments of its own. Escalation begat escalation. Not until 1973, under President Richard Nixon—who maintained his own pattern of public bullishness and private foreboding—would America’s war in Vietnam finally draw to a close. More than 58,000 Americans lay dead, along with an estimated 3m Vietnamese, 2m of them civilians. Only later would the grim reality become fully clear: just because “the best and the brightest” could issue vows of the struggle’s importance, and of corners about to be turned, did not mean they believed them. ■ Fredrik Logevall is a professor of international affairs and history at Harvard University. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//essay/2026/05/05/the-architects-of-the-vietnam-war-knew- it-was-doomed
A bombshell leak threatens Flávio Bolsonaro’s election bid Why measles is returning to the Americas Guatemala, once Latin America’s rule-of-law beacon, has new hope
A bombshell leak threatens Flávio Bolsonaro’s election bid Text and voice messages show a close connection between Flávio and Daniel Vorcaro, a disgraced banker May 14th 2026 On May 13th Intercept Brasil, a left-leaning investigative outlet, published messages exchanged between Flávio Bolsonaro, the leading presidential candidate of the Brazilian right going into the general election in October, and Daniel Vorcaro, a disgraced banker at the centre of Brazil’s largest-ever bank fraud. The messages show Flávio asking Mr Vorcaro to complete payments related to the financing of a film about his father, Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil’s right-wing populist former president, who is serving a 27-year prison sentence for attempting to mount a coup in 2022.
Right-wing parties immediately started talking about fielding an alternative candidate. On betting markets, where Flávio had been favourite to win the presidency, he plunged into second place by ten points. The Brazilian real and the main stock index both fell 2% as the prospect of victory rose for President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the spendthrift left-wing incumbent. Mr Vorcaro has become radioactive in the past year. Trouble began when he tried to sell his bank, Banco Master. He couldn’t find a buyer. Banco de Brasília (BRB), a lender owned by the local government of the capital district, offered to step in. Yet when the regulator studied the merger, it found that Banco Master was essentially a Ponzi scheme. Mr Vorcaro was arrested in November as he tried to board a private jet to Dubai. The former president of BRB was also detained after evidence emerged that he had received bribes worth $30m from Mr Vorcaro. The central bank has liquidated Banco Master. Brazil’s deposit-insurance fund is reimbursing investor losses of $11bn, about half of the fund’s total assets. As investigations into Mr Vorcaro have deepened, few in Brasília have been spared. Mr Vorcaro was more focused on running an influence-peddling scheme than a bank, building close ties with Supreme Court justices, politicians of all stripes and some officials at the central bank. He bought favours for years by splashing out on parties for politicians, flying in prostitutes from Russia, Ukraine and Venezuela on private jets. In one text message to his former girlfriend, Mr Vorcaro explained that he had hosted parties with 300 sex workers because it was part of “business”. As his fortunes turned, he prodded underlings to spy on government officials and smear adversaries. Brazil’s voters hate it. As the scandal unfurls, corruption has become their primary concern. For months Flávio has publicly denied any links to Mr Vorcaro. In March he was questioned about the fact that the largest private donor to his father’s re- election campaign in 2022 had been Fabiano Zettel, Mr Vorcaro’s brother-in- law and financial front man. Flávio told reporters that the donation was made “without strings attached, without quid pro quo, and without any personal contact whatsoever” between the Bolsonaros and Mr Vorcaro. As late as the morning of May 13th Flávio denied links to the banker. The messages were published a few hours later.
In one message sent in September last year Flávio says to Mr Vorcaro: “I feel bad about constantly nagging you, but this is a very critical moment in the film, and since we’re so far behind schedule, everyone is worried.” In another text, sent the day before Mr Vorcaro was arrested, Flávio wrote: “Brother, I am and will always be with you; there’s no beating around the bush between us. I just need you to give me a heads-up! Hugs.” By that point, Banco Master’s dealings were well-known. Flávio denies any wrongdoing. In a statement after the leak, he finally acknowledged his ties to Mr Vorcaro, but said that “What happened in our case was a son seeking PRIVATE sponsorship for a PRIVATE film about his own father’s life.” This did not appease his supporters. On Instagram, many bolsonaristas fumed. “Fuck, man, go home. Everything’s fucked now, damn it,” exclaimed one. Other right-wing candidates could hardly believe their luck. Romeu Zema, a technocratic former governor of Minas Gerais who intends to run for president, released a video scolding Flávio: “Hearing you ask for money from Vorcaro is unforgivable. It’s a slap in the face of all decent Brazilians.” According to the documents published by Intercept, Mr Vorcaro had agreed to pay $24m to finance the production of “Dark Horse”, a biopic about Mr Bolsonaro due to be released weeks before the general election. Around $10.6m had been paid out before Mr Vorcaro’s troubles began. Some of the money flowed through accounts owned by a lawyer for Eduardo Bolsonaro, Flávio’s brother, who moved to the United States last year to lobby Donald Trump to block his father’s criminal case. Flávio’s allies hope continuing Banco Master investigations will ensnare more politicians from the ruling Workers’ Party. The bad news has been piling up for the right. On May 7th Lula, as Brazil’s president is known, met with Mr Trump at the White House for three hours. Afterwards Lula talked up their “chemistry” and said their relationship was like “love at first sight”. On a phone call before the meeting, Mr Trump reportedly told Lula “I love you”. This sits uneasily with the Bolsonaros, who have boasted of being pals with Mr Trump. While Lula was at the White House, police in Brazil raided properties owned by Ciro Nogueira, a powerful senator and Jair Bolsonaro’s former
chief of staff. Mr Nogueira had introduced an amendment in Congress that would have helped Banco Master’s business. Mr Vorcaro paid him a monthly allowance of up to $100,000. Mr Nogueira denies wrongdoing. Mr Vorcaro had described him as “a great friend” in text messages. In texts to Flávio, he preferred the term “big brother”. ■ Sign up to El Boletín, our subscriber-only newsletter on Latin America, to understand the forces shaping a fascinating and complex region. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//the-americas/2026/05/14/a-bombshell-leak-threatens- flavio-bolsonaros-election-bid
Why measles is returning to the Americas Falling vaccination coverage is letting a deadly virus back in May 14th 2026 The elimination of measles from the Americas in 2016 was spectacular. No other region of the world had ever managed to go a year without sustained transmission of the disease, the UN World Health Organisation’s bar for elimination. But it did not last long. In 2017 cases flared in patchily vaccinated Venezuela. Migrants fleeing hyperinflation and regime brutality carried measles over the border to Brazil. It tore through the deprived Amazon area before finding its way to the densely populated state of São Paulo. By the time covid-19 arrived three years later, with lockdowns and masks curbing transmission, measles had infected at least 30,000 people and killed more than a hundred, mostly young children or infants. It was the worst period for measles in the Americas for 22 years.
The current outbreak is set to be worse (see chart 1). By April 25th the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO), an arm of the WHO, had recorded 18,352 confirmed cases across the Americas in 2026. The virus is spreading, having infected 14,503 people last year. At least 45 people have died in the outbreak so far, mostly children. The majority of cases are in Mexico and Guatemala, but the virus has got a foothold in Bolivia and Peru too. Measles is still nowhere near as prevalent in the Americas as it was in the 20th century, before vaccination efforts began; 200,000 cases a year was the norm. Hantavirus, a pathogen found in rodents that is prevalent in South America, is the disease in the news recently after it infected people on a cruise in South America. But measles is far more infectious, and far more dangerous if not contained with vaccination programmes. Rolling outbreaks suggest efforts to do so are faltering. Most vulnerable are babies before their first jab, who risk brain damage, blindness or death. The latest outbreak started at a wedding in Canada in October 2024, attended by Mennonites, a close-knit Christian group who often eschew vaccination. One guest travelled from Thailand carrying measles. Others were infected, and carried the disease back to their homes and communities. By early 2025 the virus had spread to Mennonites in Texas and Mexico. “It is unprecedented how [its spread] has been related to a socially isolated
group with connections throughout the hemisphere, from Argentina up through Canada,” says Jon Andrus of Paho. In Canada and the United States the outbreak has been largely confined to Mennonites. But in Mexico and other poorer places in the Americas, slipping vaccination programmes have exposed the general population to infection. In 2014 some 96% of Mexican children received a second dose of measles vaccine, above the 95% required for a population to benefit from herd immunity. By 2024 that number was less than 70%. Many other Latin American countries moved in the same direction over that period (see chart 2). Latin America has gone from having one of the world’s highest rates of childhood vaccination to one of the lowest. The outbreak prompted Mexico’s government to start an emergency immunisation drive. Between January 2025 and March 2026 it gave out some 30m doses. Nurses have been going door to door offering the jab, and setting up vaccine centres in shops and at bus stations. Cases appear to have peaked, for now, says Dr Andrus, but a new challenge looms. On June 11th Mexico will begin hosting the football World Cup, together with the United States and Canada. FIFA projects that some 5.5m fans will attend the tournament. PAHO is urging host countries to start actively looking for