as both rootless and sectarian, reactionary and subversive, they become catch-all avatars for disorienting change. Understanding the deep roots of antisemitism is key to confronting it. The already fortress-like security at Jewish institutions is being reinforced. Pro- Palestinian marches and the slogans chanted on them are under reconsideration, too. Politicians are seeking to balance the protesters’ right to free expression and the right of Jews to safety, which many feel is threatened by the marchers’ invective. The Economist is highly sceptical of speech bans. Arresting grandmothers does nobody any good. Laws cannot banish ingrained assumptions and archetypes: something bigger and more difficult is required. Many people have learned to be more considerate when talking to and about other minorities; and when people talk differently, they can come to think differently. It is past time for Jews to be shown this respect. Education can help. But above all, political and religious leaders—and ordinary citizens— must call out antisemitism whenever they hear it. Too many have shamefully failed to do so. The anguish of Jewish citizens ought to be motivation enough. But the echoes of history suggest another reason to act. Jews are the victims of these assaults, but theirs is not the only future at stake. Rather they are a crucial test of the freedom to live and worship as you wish. When those rights are not upheld, the mob is ascendant, and the values of pluralism and tolerance that underpin free societies are in danger. ■ Subscribers to The Economist can sign up to our Opinion newsletter, which brings together the best of our leaders, columns, guest essays and reader correspondence. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//leaders/2026/05/05/to-fight-antisemitism-first-grasp- where-it-comes-from
Europe is unshackling business. But not enough Why market liberals must win the battle for Brussels—and national capitals, too May 7th 2026 Everyone knows that the European Union’s economy is weighed down by regulation. But you may not have spotted that everyone now includes Europeans themselves. They are so rattled that the momentum to fix the problem is the greatest in a generation. On April 28th the eu unveiled plans for its rule-making to be simpler and more consistent. It gave a timeline for accomplishing this, and for removing barriers to trade within the bloc. The trillion-euro question is whether, after many false starts, Europe can at last turn its good intentions into progress. Europe needs to grow if it is to pay its debts, care for its swelling legions of elderly citizens and defend itself without America’s help. Yet its economy is
far behind that of Uncle Sam. In the first quarter its output barely grew—and now the Iran war has driven up energy prices. The battle for growth is being fought on two fronts. The first is in Brussels, where two very different strategies vie for favour. Some eurocrats think the eu should pivot to subsidies, protectionism and Chinese-style state capitalism. Others prefer the liberal route of more open, competitive and integrated markets. In recent years the EU’s economic thinking has acquired a more French flavour: somewhat warier of competitive markets and free trade, more in favour of dirigisme. Encouragingly, however, some more liberal attitudes are holding their own. Proposed changes to the EU’s strict merger guidelines once seemed likely to water down the bloc’s traditional devotion to consumer welfare so that “European champions” might emerge. Now it looks as if the rules will be tweaked rather than overhauled. Europe’s commitment to competiton survives. Still, it is one thing to avoid backsliding. What about progress? As well as the deregulatory push, which includes ten “omnibus” bills aimed at reducing companies’ administrative costs, trade continues to be liberalised. On May 1st a pact between the EU and Mercosur—whose full members are
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay—provisionally came into effect. New agreements have also been struck with India, Indonesia and Australia, and pacts with Malaysia and the Philippines are in the offing. Unlike President Donald Trump’s often superficial and fragile trade deals, these ones are deep and the product of years of work. The second fight is at the national level and will be harder to win. Much rule-making power sits with national governments, which love to blame Brussels for their own red tape. They often choose to protect domestic firms, especially from foreign competition in services. They also make the eu’s rules more burdensome when writing them into domestic law. Politicians are under constant pressure from protectionists who resist everything from connecting up electricity grids to letting firms registered in one country operate in another. Reforms at the national level are slow. Each government is one of 27. Too few share Brussels’ new sense of urgency. Many are loth to take on vested interests, hoping to reap the benefits of reform in other countries without having to pay a political price themselves. With recent changes, such as with Denmark’s postal service or Dutch pensions, the action has mostly been in market-friendly places. Countries bogged down with rules, such as Italy and Germany, have done too little. Boosting European growth requires national governments to join the liberalising effort. It also means implementing many of the other recommendations set out in the dossiers penned by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi, two former Italian prime ministers. Europe’s startups need more capital, which might be provided by adequately funding pension schemes while continuing to integrate capital markets across borders. The continent must attract more of the world’s most talented workers, with bloc-wide visa schemes and by recognising foreign qualifications. And it needs cheaper energy, which requires investment in its grid and the careful design of markets as more renewable power comes online. None of this will be easy. The eu has endless counterproductive regulations. Attempts to get rid of them often fail, not least because reactionaries on the left and right defend them. But Europe is also a huge economy of 450m people, with nearly a fifth of global output. Will the wealth of that prize and
the dire consequences of failure make this time different? More than ever, Europeans need to simplify and deregulate. ■ Subscribers to The Economist can sign up to our Opinion newsletter, which brings together the best of our leaders, columns, guest essays and reader correspondence. This article was downloaded by zlibrary from https://www.economist.com//leaders/2026/05/07/europe-is-unshackling-business-but- not-enough
Why does Britain consistently fail to capture economic returns from innovation? Also this week, the Marquis de Morès, human rights, voter choice, maths and AI, the Victorians, bald men, eggs May 7th 2026 Letters are welcome via email to letters@economist.comFind out more about how we process your letter It is true that Britain generates world-class innovation but consistently fails to capture the economic returns from it (“In-no-vation nation”, April 11th). Your diagnosis of high costs, regulatory hurdles and a shortage of domestic late-stage investment is incomplete. The problem of capital flight is, more precisely, one of capital-markets architecture and governance frameworks.
The question is not: how do we stop British companies from leaving Britain? That wrongly frames the issue as one of national industrial policy. Instead we should be asking why do companies born from British innovation and British university education conclude that British capital markets cannot support their growth? Two goals have been conflated. The first, that Britain should generate world- class innovation, is substantially being achieved. Britain is the third-largest venture-capital market globally. The second, that British capital markets and governance should be competitive enough to retain the economic returns for British shareholders, pensioners and the wider economy, is not. The solution will require timely capital markets, governance, and regulatory reforms outside the normal comfort zone for everyone involved. Pascal LevensohnChairGlobal advisory boardCambridge Innovation Hub Charlemagne (April 25th) rightly highlights Europe’s structural dependencies in technology and finance. But the recurring question of why Europe has not built its own Google deserves a more nuanced answer. I asked this very question to a senior Google executive in 2009. His reply was disarmingly simple. Palo Alto works because of three things: funding, Stanford, and a tolerance for failure. The first point remains Europe’s most persistent weakness. For years, fragmented capital markets have constrained the scaling of innovative firms. Without deep and integrated pools of risk capital, European entrepreneurs have too often lacked the means to grow at pace. This is not merely a financial issue but a structural one, which helps explain part of the transatlantic productivity gap. The long-discussed Capital Markets Union, and now the Savings and Investment Union, offers a credible path forward. If delivered with ambition, it could at last unlock Europe’s vast household savings for innovation. The second factor, talent, may, paradoxically, be Europe’s greatest opportunity today. In a more uncertain geopolitical environment, Europe remains an attractive destination for highly skilled individuals. But attracting talent is not enough; it must also be retained and empowered through world-class universities, flexible labour markets and a genuine single market for skills.